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In After Hegemony, Keohane contends that cooperation, albeit difficult to achieve in the absence of an international government, is nevertheless an attainable goal, due to the fact that enduring international institutions established by former hegemons can function as arbiters of interstate cooperation. This assertion is quite contrary to and critical of the beliefs of Neo-realists, who believe cooperation amongst states without the presence of a hegemon is cumbersome to the point of near-impossibility. However, while Keohane is correct in his claim that post-hegemonic cooperation among states can mutually maximize states’ interests, resolves the “prisoner’s dilemma” of international politics, and is overall far more feasible than what Neo-realists theorize, the ability of his theory to explain and predict future trends of international political economy is rather limited in scope, due to his arguments’ principal focus on analyzing relationships between advanced-market economies in the context of modernity and because American hegemony has arguably not declined to an extent that is sufficient to prove the components of Keohane’s theory surrounding how processes of regime change and policy adjustment engender interstate cooperation in practice.
Although the bases of Keohane’s argument are rooted in neorealist premises, such as the use of system-level analysis, the inherent egoism of states, and the foundational role of anarchy in determining the nature of international politics, he considerably deviates from the neorealist school of thought when he contends that the anarchic, self-help system of international politics can coexist with norms, principles and institutions which facilitate and promote interstate cooperation, “I assume, with the Realists, that actors are rational egoists.
I propose to show, on the basis of their own assumptions, that the characteristic pessimism of Realism does not necessarily follow.
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I seek to demonstrate that Realist assumptions about world politics are consistent with the formation of institutionalized arrangements, containing rules and principles, which promote cooperation.” In essence, Keohane argues that neoliberalist regimes make cooperation possible even following the decline of hegemony. If the norms, principles, and institutions established by the former hegemon remain in place, they can continue to aid processes of interstate cooperation, even as notions of hegemonically-induced stability and cooperation deteriorate.
Regimes, as defined by Keohane, are “intervening variables” which determine how the international distribution of power affects the behavior of state and non-state actors. However, it is important to note that while Keohane posits that the norms, principles, and institutions established by international regimes undoubtedly affect the nature and outcomes of state behavior and interaction, the influence they exert upon state behavior is rooted in the process of mutually beneficial policy adjustment. The impossibility of attaining Rousseauist ideals of innately harmonic interstate interactions and the dangers of discord in international politics necessitates both regime change to the extent it is necessary in order to sufficiently align one state’s interests with that of another’s and the development and/or proliferation of international institutions to realize the mutual maximization of state interests. Therefore, while Keohane clearly indicates the possibility for interstate cooperation after hegemony, he does not entirely refute the neorealist notion that states are inherently egoistic, and aim to maximize their own interests through processes of negotiation and policy coordination. With regards to trends of international political economy in the post-WWII era, Keohane’s hypothesis is largely correct; amongst modern, economically liberal economies, multilateral efforts at policy coordination have materialized into regimes which develop mutually beneficial patterns of interaction. Keohane cites the example of post-WWII global trade liberalization to illustrate this phenomenon. From 1958 to 1971, an essential norm of what Keohane refers to as the “international balance of trade regime” was to make the injunction to states not to manipulate their exchange rates in an unilaterally advantageous manner; this injunction enforced by the presence of preexisting norms and principles such as pegged exchange rates and protocols for borrowing and internal adjustment designed to avoid changes in exchange rates. Both the pressure to prescribe to these norms and the benefits of doing so ultimately inclined states to engage in processes of policy coordination. Considering this case, Keohane is able to make the assertion that shared interests, in this case, stabilizing exchange rates, fosters the creation of regimes which bolster the power of pre-existing institutions to foster interstate cooperation and become self-functioning and independent in spite of the absence of a hegemonic world order. This is evident in how states still maintained their commitment to mutually advantageous policies of monetary policy coordination despite the fact that official mandates devised to stabilize international exchange rates were largely swept away following the early 1970’s.
The example of global trade liberalization is also representative of another key tenet of Keohane’s hypothesis, of how interstate cooperation can work towards solving the “prisoner’s dilemma” of international politics. According to Keohane, one of the goals of cooperation between states should be to ensure that all states involved find it more desirable to cooperate with one another than to defect, a goal which is accomplished through iterations of the “prisoner’s dilemma”. As contended by Keohane, although it initially would seem to be more rational for a state to defect, or unilaterally benefit at the expense of another state or states, this definition of rational-choice is based off of the fallacious assumption that the “prisoner’s dilemma” only occurs once or a handful of times. In reality, when the “prisoner’s dilemma” is iterated by the same players without a definite endpoint, it is far more rational for states to “confess”, or cooperate, than to defect from one another, for the short term payoff of defection is exceedingly outweighed by the mutual disadvantages incurred by consistent defection. The iterated “prisoner’s dilemma” changes the payoff structures of cooperation to such a great extent that it becomes the clearly rational choice for states to pursue. Because states must consider the ramifications of the “shadow of the future”, or eventual repercussions of the decisions made in the present, states become increasingly inclined to cooperate, perhaps accepting relative gains from such an interaction, rather than eventually suffering the consequence of mutual detriment as the result of defection. Therefore, with regards to the example Keohane employs of trade liberalization, the introduction of the norm that states should not change exchange rates for their unilateral benefit and the principles which mandate that states maintain their exchange rates are real-world manifestations of how mutual cooperation can resolve the “prisoner’s dilemma”. Because processes of trade and economic exchange go on indefinitely, it is ultimately far more profitable for states to cooperate through the mutually beneficial coordination of their monetary policies as a strategy for maximizing their interests than to defect by assuring only their own economic advancement, because due to the inevitable iteration of the “prisoner’s dilemma”, such a strategy would result in mutual economic damage, and would thereby be an irrational strategy to pursue.
Despite the apparent accuracy of Keohane’s theory in describing and explaining trends of international political economy following WWII, it is nevertheless difficult to definitively prove his assumption that the institutions formed by a hegemon will become self-functioning & independent following the hegemon’s decline, due to two main factors: firstly, the premise of Keohane’s argument about the nature of regime change and interstate cooperation is almost exclusively applicable to modern, advanced-market economies; the lack of historical context for the phenomenon he describes and the uncertainty of the future of international political economy severely limit the scope of his argument’s applicability to conjecture about the future of international political economy. Secondly, there is the fact that American hegemony has not deteriorated enough to observe how effectively states are able to cooperate after hegemony via international regimes and the use of existing institutions promulgated by former hegemons. Although Keohane argues that the rise of a small group of states which frequently cooperates with one another collectively acts a hegemon, due to their respective leadership roles in economic institutions such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and their use of institutions to foster cooperation, the indelible “influence effect” of the United States remains palpable, for the structure of international politics is often dictated by American desires, as evident in how certain institutions are predominantly presided over by the U.S and therefore can coerce cooperation through their hegemonic status, for example, when the United States asked Citgo, a Venezuelan-owned oil company, to lower their prices in order to better serve U.S. interests, through coercion.
Overall, with regards to proving the theoretical possibility of post-hegemonic cooperation among states, Keohane makes a compelling argument that international regimes can develop from shared state interests and in turn utilize previously implemented norms, principles and institutions to mutually maximize states’ interests and resolve the “prisoner’s dilemma” of international politics. However, in practice, it proves quite difficult to substantiate his claims with regards to predicting the future of international political economy, due to the parameters Keohane’s argument sets for the study of neoliberal, advanced-market economies and the persistent reality of de facto American hegemony. Therefore, although Keohane’s theory provides a compelling description and explanation of tendencies of cooperation in international politics among advanced-market economies in the context of the post-WWII era, definitive proof of his thesis’ assertions must await the indisputable decline of American hegemony.
Transforming the Nature of International Anarchy. (2022, Jan 27). Retrieved from https://studymoose.com/transforming-the-nature-of-international-anarchy-essay
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