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What is the role of airpower and its challenges in irregular wars?
What is the role of airpower in this era of conflict?
The conventional air force is organized, equipped and trained to conduct conventional operations, but is it structured to deal with irregular threats? What could be its challenges?
Winston Churchill once suggested, 'Air power is the most difficult of all forms of military force to measure, or even express in precise terms.' Today, the world is seeing airpower as a matured military capability and indispensable military force to the big or small states.
For example, Israel has no strategic depth and she will have to wage war against a numerically superior adversary.
To protect her national interest, Israelis has successfully developed air power as its the main deterrence factor against her potential adversaries.
However, the world is seeing close to little or no conventional warfare but new era where irregular wars are common and strategic significant. This essay posit that while the conventional air force is organised, equipped and trained to conduct conventional warfare, it is still well positioned to deal with irregular threats.
Notably, this essay will also point out the challenges in doing so, citing Singapore as an example.
For this essay, the definition of airpower is based on the USAF's definition in year 2003 where it is defined as 'the synergistic application of air, space and information systemsto project global strategic military power.' Notably, for small states, this essay assumes smaller air forces use airpower to project deterrence, instead of global strategic military power.
The definition of irregular wars (IW) is based on DoD where it is defined as "a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s)."
Notably, irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence and will.
Notwithstanding, examples of IW are insurgency, Unconventional Warfare (UW) and Terrorism.
Air forces in the world are typically structure for conventional warfare (CW). For example, the United States Air Force (USAF), the Israeli Air Force (IAF) and the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF).
Regardless of CW or IW, airpower remains relevant as airpower can be structured to handle both CW and IW as elaborated in the following paragraphs. Notably, an air force from a small state will be used as an example - assuming if a small state can do so, bigger state can do likewise (but it will take a longer time).
Airpower is Still a Force Deterrence against IW. Regardless of CW or IW, it is operationally viable to exploit technologies from the airpower to deter IW. This is also supported by General Deptula. For example, airpower theory suggested the importance of technology as a force multiplier in CW.
Likewise, this is also a force multiplier for IW. Conventional capability such as Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) - such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles - and fifth Generation Aircraft (such as F-35) can become a deadly combination of "sensor-shooters" to deter IW.
As the fifth generation aircraft is designed to link with UAV, airforce can combine attributes of traditional ISR and - stealthy, data-linked aerial platform armed with advanced precision weapons. This can be used for surgically strike on IW related targets.
In the case of Singapore, the 3G RSAF (2000s onwards) is capable of doing multi-mission type forces with capabilities against wide spectrum of threats (including IW). Of significance, the RSAF is able negate the potential IW's combat capability and thus, restoring the credibility of deterrence.
Airpower is still able to Provide Strategic/ Tactical Intelligences against IW. In CW, RPA can remain over a target area for long durations to do either intelligence gathering, communications disruption, or launch attacks.
Such capability can be used for both CW and IW to obtain strategic or tactical intelligences against IW. For example, as inferred from Singapore's Defence Minister Ng Ng Eng Hen, conventional airpower such as Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability from the RPA is able to provide strategic or tactical Intelligences that can be used by the Police and military to counter terrorism.
Airpower related Military Doctrines for CW are still Applicable against IW. Military Doctrine are operational concepts and fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of the objectives. Of note, the doctrine developed for CW is also applicable for IW.
For example, it is evident from the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) - through her counter-terrorism exercise - demonstrated that airpower is still applicable against IW. For example, the RSAF is able to airlift - via the Super Puma (AS330) and insert the Special Operations Task Force (SOTF) in strategic location to counter terrorism.
Also, the Short Range Class Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (SR UAV) is able to provide strategic or tactical Intelligences that can be used by the SOTF to counter terrorism.
Airpower is Flexible to Deal with the Unexpected (against IW). In CW, airpower has three key characteristics that make it an indispensable part of any military force, regardless if it is big or small states. They are (i) rapid maneuver - airpower has speed, mobility and maneuverability i.e. not constrained by land terrain, (ii) Surprise - airpower can provide indirect approach for military strategy, for e.g.
ISR by RPA, and (3) Flexibility - airpower is flexible to react quickly to any change in command, plans and operations. For example, it can be inferred that the airpower developed for CW in the SAF is flexible to deal with the unexpected (against IW).
For example, SAF is able to deploy airpower - developed for CW - to swiftly respond to the tsunami disaster in Banda Aceh and Meulaboh, for e.g., C-130 aircraft were deployed within two days to ferry tents, groundsheets, blankets, as well as medical and food supplies to Medan. Also, RSAF helicopters and transport aircraft performed 250 missions in carrying more than 1,000,000 pounds of cargo and 4,000 people.
Emergence of small Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (sUAVs). With the advent of the 4th IR, we have witnessed a rapid development of smaller and yet smarter UAVs. Broadly, these small UAVs (sUAVs) have become more capable, available and dangerous.
This means that it can be deployed for CW or IW. Notably, it can be used by non-state actors as well. For example, in January 2018, Syrian rebel carried out a coordinated 13 sUAVs - each sUAV rigged with explosives devices - to attack two of Russian's military bases in western Syria.
As the Radar Cross Section (RCS) of the sUAV is similar to a bird, detecting a sUAV is more difficult than detecting a fighter plane. It was reported that Israel had recently used a USD $3 million Patriot missile to shoot down a USD $200 quadcopter . It is definitely an overkill to respond with expensive, high-end system designed for state-on-state warfare on sUAVs.
Hence, there is a need to develop a new suite of counter UAV measures or plans to effectively defend against the potential threats from sUAVs. The SAF must continue to develop anti-drones technology to counter sUAVs used by non-state actors (IW). Also, the SAF must continue to work with the defence industry to tap on the potential of sUAVs for both CW and IW. For example, swarm sUAVs is shaping the future of air combat.
Swarm sUAVs is defined as a group of small UAVs, getting them in the air at the same time, and it has the ability to coordinate in air to achieve the mission.
This means that if the swarm sUAVs has a mission that it has to carry out, and it is self-reconfiguring so that if one sUAV gets taken out, the others autonomously change their behaviour to complete the mission. While any aircraft, manned or unmanned, can be brought down by a single missile, but a swarm can take multiple hits and keep going. [534 words]
The preceding sections articulated that while the conventional air force is organised, equipped and trained to conduct conventional warfare, it is still well positioned to deal with irregular threats. However, there will be its potential challenges as elaborated in the following paragraphs.
Challenges to Military Doctrines. Military Doctrines are operational concepts and fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of the objectives. There could be potential challenges to the military doctrines.
For example, the soldiers are trained and doctrinised to operate UAVs typically for surveillance and reconnaissance for CW. For IW, it can be inferred that weaponised UAVs provide the necessary political space for political leaders in countering IW. However, it may not be sustainable (long term) for soldiers to be competent in the doctrines for both CW and IW.
For the SAF, it is important to determine if regular or conscript will be operating the weaponised and non-weaponised UAV. Notably, it may not be sustainable for an dwelling and ageing population such as Singapore as these regular forces can be better deployed in areas such as Cyber. Also, the SAF will lso need to maintain certain minimum levels of training to ensure flight safety in an highly urbanised city.
Minimum Redline for Assets to Perform CW. Using the example from preceding paragraph, with the potential capability of weaponised UAV in countering IW, the military could potentially procure more weaponised UAV.
However, as in the case of Israeli Air Force (IAF), the military must also maintain a minimum red line of assets (for e.g. fighter aircraft) to perform CW related roles, for e.g. suppression of enemy air defence (SEAD) missions, that weaponised UAV cannot fulfil.
In the case of United States, it can be inferred that the increase in the UAV fleet suggested that the USAF was overly procuring armed Reaper drones in 2015 (Alley-young & Gordon, 2017) and there is a imbalance between IW and CW requirement. For the SAF, it important to raise a UAV units that can perform both CW and IW roles. However, it is also important for the SAF to maintain a minimum number of air assets for deterrence. [156 words]
Constant Assessment of New Technologies and Ideas. The Fourth Industrial Revolution (4th IR) has unveiled new possibilities for states to deploy airpower against IW. As inferred from Chief of Airforce (RSAF) , this requires constant assessment in (i) threat development and (ii) how small state can be effective and efficient through continued exploration and adaption of emerging 4th IR technology to enhance the airpower against both conventional and unconventional warfare (such as IW). (74 words)
Challenges to Procurement. State may need a suite of air power assets (for e.g. manned fighters, sUAVs) to address the potential threats for CW and IW. As such, the prevailing development and acquisition procedure by the states may not be practicable, for e.g. Life Cycle Management adopted by the Singapore Armed Forces, involves huge investments spread over long term.
With rapid technological changes, non-state actors are likely to deploy indigenous and commercially available systems such as sUAVs to negate the established military capability of the military. Hence, there is a need to refine the procurement framework to facilitate development process for quick fielding, experimentation and then improvements to address IW threats.
For the case of Singapore, SAF will need to a nimble procurement framework for quick capability development and fielding else the SAF may end up with irrelevant systems to deal with IW.
Airpower in Irregular Wars: Role, Challenges, and Adaptation. (2019, Dec 12). Retrieved from https://studymoose.com/the-role-of-airpower-essay
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