Effects of Information Asymmetry in Markets

"The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism" explores the effects of information asymmetry in a market. When sellers possess more knowledge about a product than buyers, it leads to an imbalance. This lack of transparency, which involves concealing information about the condition of goods, encourages deception within the market and erodes trust between sellers and buyers. Akerlof acknowledges that dishonesty can have serious repercussions, potentially leading to a total collapse of the market.

Akerlof's analysis illustrates the issue of uncertainty in the new and used car market.

When purchasing a used car, there is a risk of buying either a functional car or a defective one known as a 'lemon'. The condition of a used car cannot be determined by buyers, leading to the possibility of acquiring a faulty vehicle. This uncertainty causes buyers to offer lower prices due to their fear of purchasing a 'lemon'. However, buyers have some knowledge: they know that there is a probability (q) that the car is in good condition and a probability (1-q) that it is a 'lemon'.

Get quality help now
RhizMan
RhizMan
checked Verified writer

Proficient in: Business

star star star star 4.9 (247)

“ Rhizman is absolutely amazing at what he does . I highly recommend him if you need an assignment done ”

avatar avatar avatar
+84 relevant experts are online
Hire writer

Here, q represents the proportion of good cars available while (1-q) represents the proportion of lemons. Consequently, an excess supply of 'lemons' floods the market and displaces higher quality cars sold at similar prices. Ultimately, this leads to market collapse as inferior cars dominate over superior ones. The lack of information negatively impacts both buyers and sellers. Buyers are unwilling to pay market prices for cars while sellers struggle to receive fair prices for their products.

Get to Know The Price Estimate For Your Paper
Topic
Number of pages
Email Invalid email

By clicking “Check Writers’ Offers”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy policy. We’ll occasionally send you promo and account related email

"You must agree to out terms of services and privacy policy"
Write my paper

You won’t be charged yet!

As a result, market values decline due to fewer sales of high-quality cars caused by an overflow of 'lemons', ultimately resulting in an inactive market.

Akerlof introduced the concept of 'adverse selection' to demonstrate how the unequal distribution of information impacts individuals aged 65 and above in obtaining health insurance. The disparity in information results in insurance rates that do not accurately reflect the level of risk. This is because individuals who are more likely to seek insurance are also more likely to require medical assistance. Consequently, as prices rise, the overall health condition of insurance applicants deteriorates, creating a situation where insurance may become unattainable at any price.

Similarities can be drawn between the insurance market and the used car market. Just as the decrease in price for used cars corresponds with a decline in average quality, Akerlof points out a 1956 national survey indicating a decrease in insurance coverage for individuals aged 55-64 from 63% to 31% for those over 65 years old. This suggests that insurance companies hesitate to insure older individuals.

The asymmetry of information when acquiring health insurance leads to higher premiums which could be attributed to fraud, exaggerated claims, or intentional withholding of vital information. Insurance companies might offer group plans for healthier individuals while leaving those most in need without coverage. In this scenario, companies engage in their own version of 'adverse selection'.

The concept of the market for lemons can be applied to minority employment as well. Discrimination may occur when employers have preconceived notions about a specific minority group. Akerlof argues that this discrimination is driven by the desire to maximize profit and is not necessarily irrational or biased. The author suggests that race can serve as a statistical indicator of an applicant's background and upbringing, but Akerlof proposes that educational certificates provide a more accurate assessment of potential talent within minority groups. According to Akerlof (1970), even though an untrained worker may possess natural abilities, these abilities must be certified by the education system before companies are willing to utilize them. This creates a challenge for disadvantaged minorities as it becomes difficult for employers to differentiate between individuals with strong qualifications and those with weak qualifications.

Working in slum areas can help to remove the stigma associated with minority groups, aiming to eliminate the stigma that pertains to the group as a whole rather than individuals. However, in order to assess the advantages and achievements of its programs, the office of economic opportunity will implement a cost-benefit analysis. Many of the benefits experienced by minorities may have an external impact. The training of minority groups can benefit the entire group rather than specific individuals. In simpler terms, many individuals will benefit from these programs, although not all. Alternatively, an individual may benefit from the program rather than the entire group. In conclusion, working in slum schools improves the overall quality of the group.

George Borjas argues that racial prejudice is often based on a preference for discrimination instead of maximizing profit. He states that discrimination is not beneficial from a financial perspective. For instance, the decision to only employ white workers and exclude minority workers can be proven to be unprofitable in two ways. Firstly, in order to attract a larger pool of white workers, the employer must increase the wage rate. Since minority workers and white workers are perfect substitutes, a non-discriminatory company can produce the same output at a lower price. Secondly, Borjas suggests that firms that exclusively hire white workers employ an incorrect number of workers compared to a non-discriminatory firm. He concludes that the most profitable firm is the one with a zero discrimination coefficient (Borjas, 2008).

Dishonesty has a negative impact on markets as it can lead to customers purchasing misrepresented goods, unable to discern between genuine and poor quality. This presence of dishonest sellers can drive legitimate businesses out of the market. The cost of dishonesty not only affects the cheated purchaser, but also includes the loss of legitimate business. In underdeveloped countries like India, dishonesty is a serious issue in economic trade. Akerlof (1970) highlights the need for quality control in exports, citing Indian housewives having to carefully examine rice in local bazaars due to intentionally added stones. Dishonest sellers can ultimately cause the market to decline as people become hesitant to pay for goods of questionable quality. Akerlof suggests that merchants with the skill to differentiate between quality products and fakes may have an advantage in becoming successful entrepreneurs.

Credit markets in underdeveloped countries face challenges due to dishonesty. When firms gain a reputation for honesty, they often have a monopoly advantage and can charge higher fees that are difficult for many individuals to repay. In addition, financing sources are often limited to local communal groups, as this promotes honest dealings within the community. Akerlof suggests that determining why the savings of wealthy landlords are not invested in the industrial sector is extraordinarily difficult, whether it is due to fear of investing in ventures controlled by other communities, high consumption rates, or low rates of return (Akerlof, 1970).

Various institutions have emerged to protect the market from uncertainty. Nowadays, guarantees are provided with many goods and services to reassure buyers about their quality. When a guarantee is offered, it transfers the risk of purchasing defective items from the buyer to the seller.

Brand named products also play a role in ensuring quality by guaranteeing authenticity and allowing customers to seek compensation if their expectations are not met. Chains of stores employ similar measures as brand names to ensure quality, which builds consumer trust.

For example, even if a McDonalds located on an inter-urban highway in the United States may not have many loyal customers, people still choose to eat there because they can rely on the burgers' quality and know what to expect.

Licensing practices for professionals like doctors or lawyers also contribute towards market quality assurance since most skilled professionals hold certifications that demonstrate their proficiency at certain levels.

Akerlof's article on the market for lemons faced criticism and rejection from multiple economic journals, including the American Economic Review, the Review of Economic Studies, and the Journal of Political Economy. These journals considered the article both trivial and inaccurate. Akerlof (2001) recalls receiving two referee reports from the Journal of Political Economy that disputed his findings, arguing that if his paper was correct, it would have significant implications for economics. Furthermore, Akerlof's paper did not acknowledge the possibility that consumers could take precautions to avoid buying a lemon car. It also proposed that used car sellers could offer warranties as a way to maintain their reputation and allow buyers to assess whether a car is high quality or a lemon.

The presence of dishonesty in markets leads to an imbalance of information between buyers and sellers regarding the quality of goods and services, which significantly impacts these markets. This asymmetry poses a risk to various market aspects. Differentiating the quality of goods and services is crucial in the business realm as it acts as a key protection for a market. Although unlimited guarantees can prevent market failure, Akerlof (1970) argues that their provision will lead to negative consequences for businesses.

Bibliography

  1. Akerlof, G. (1970) The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84, (3): 489.
  2. Akerlof, G. (1970) The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84, (3): 492-493.
  3. Akerlof, G. (1970) The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84, (3): 494.
  4. Borjas, G. (2008) Labor Economics. 4th Edition. New York: Mc Graw- Hill.
  5. Akerlof, G. (1970) The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84, (3): 495.
  6. Akerlof, G. (1970) The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84, (3): 496.
  7. Akerlof, G. (1970) The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84, (3): 498.
  8. Akerlof, G. (2001) Writing the "The Market for 'Lemons'": A Personal and Interpretive Essay. Available at: http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2001/akerlof-article.html. [Accessed 26 September 2012]
  9. Akerlof, G. (2001) Writing the "The Market for 'Lemons'": A Personal and Interpretive Essay. Available at: http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2001/akerlof-article.html. [Accessed 26 September 2012]
  10. Akerlof, G. (1970) The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84, (3): 500.
Updated: Feb 16, 2024
Cite this page

Effects of Information Asymmetry in Markets. (2016, Mar 09). Retrieved from https://studymoose.com/the-market-for-lemons-about-quality-of-product-essay

Effects of Information Asymmetry in Markets essay
Live chat  with support 24/7

👋 Hi! I’m your smart assistant Amy!

Don’t know where to start? Type your requirements and I’ll connect you to an academic expert within 3 minutes.

get help with your assignment