Examining Hume's Classification of Virtues

Exploring the contrast between Hume's 'natural' and 'artificial' virtues, this essay will examine his rationale for categorizing virtues and the criteria he uses to differentiate between them. Despite discussing the challenges with Hume's classification, specifically concerning justice, the overall analysis casts uncertainty on the validity of his distinction.

According to Hume, it is important to differentiate between virtues when determining moral good or evil. He believes that with an infinite number of potential situations, having a unique instinct or principle for each one would be unreasonable.

Instead, Hume proposes that we should seek more universal principles by following nature's tendency to create diversity from limited foundations.

Hume advises seeking general principles in nature while also warning about the multiple interpretations of the term 'natural'. (T 3. 1. 2. 7) He later remarks on the broad and unclear definition of the word 'natural', stating that debating whether justice is natural seems pointless. (EPM Appx.)

3. 9. ) It is crucial for him to address this issue early on, as the classification of various virtues, particularly 'justice', relies heavily on a precise definition.

Get quality help now

Bella Hamilton

Verified writer

Proficient in: Virtues

5 (234)

“ Very organized ,I enjoyed and Loved every bit of our professional interaction ”

+84 relevant experts are online

Hire writer

Allowing 'natural' to be open to interpretation would complicate the categorization of many of the 70 or more virtues he mentions. If the virtues were able to move between categories, it could disrupt the concept of having clear distinctions. After introducing this concern, he resolves it by explaining different meanings or situations in which 'natural' could be commonly interpreted:

1. According to David Hume, nature can be seen as the opposite of miracles, making everything except miracles, including virtue and vice, considered natural (T3.

1. 2. 7). All quotes from Hume are from An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. Beauchamp T. L. 1st ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998 (abbreviated as EPM) and A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. Norton, M. and Norton, D. 1st ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2011 (abbreviated as T 1 2). Nature can also be seen in contrast to 'rare and unusual', which Hume argues is subjective and dependent on observation.

Hume argues that despite some vagueness, the 'sentiments of morality' can be considered natural, as no nation or individual has ever lacked 'approbation or dislike of manners'. He asserts that this 'moral sense' is so ingrained that only illness or insanity could erase it (T3. 1. 2. 8). Hume further criticizes the philosophical conflation of virtue with natural and vice with unnatural, which he deems 'unphilosophical'. Additionally, he contrasts this natural moral context with 'artifice'.

In this context, Hume argues that the natural or artificial nature of virtue is not entirely clear and can only be determined by examining specific vices or virtues. He introduces two distinctions between civil and moral virtues, which will be addressed later in his argument. Instead of providing explicit definitions, Hume suggests that understanding the context will reveal the intended meaning of the term 'natural'.

Hume concludes that virtues can be classified into two categories for his argument: natural and artificial. Natural virtues, according to Hume, are innate traits that exist in humans naturally, such as self-love, benevolence, and charity. These traits are essential for cooperation within small groups and are considered good and agreeable. On the other hand, artificial virtues include traits like wit, good manners, and dialogue, which are not commonly mentioned but are still important for societal interactions.

Artificial virtues, such as justice, fidelity, honesty, and chastity, are constructed by humans to address situations outside of family and personal relationships. These social conventions, discussed by Hume, may not always lead to good outcomes in individual cases and can even cause pain. One problem with artificial virtues is the argument by Hume in EPM 3 that justice is artificial.

1. In section 2 of his work, it appears that Hume's idea seems to have a flaw. He envisions a world of abundance where people have all they need, do not need clothing to keep warm, and are fully provided for. In this supposed 'happy state', Hume argues that every social virtue would thrive except for justice. However, I am skeptical of this claim as it only suggests that justice may not be necessary in such ideal conditions, rather than proving it would never exist. Just because justice is not observed in a specific scenario does not mean it is artificial.

In EPM, Hume appears to weaken his own argument and even questions his previous claims. In the footnote (EPM Appx 3. 9 fn 64), Hume's language is not forceful or decisive, stating that while justice and property are natural in some senses, in the sense of being artificial, they may not strictly be considered as such. In EPM Appx 3. 9, Hume raises the question of whether virtues like justice, order, fidelity, and society, which he had previously classified as artificial, can also be considered natural if self-love, benevolence, reason, and forethought are deemed natural.

'Men's inclinations,' according to Hume, lead them to combine due to their necessities. Even in a 'happy state,' where these necessities are minimal, Hume implies that men are naturally inclined towards society. He further argues that in such a wise creature, what arises from intellectual efforts can be considered natural. Therefore, justice and society should not be viewed as special cases and should be judged no differently than benevolence or self-love.

According to Hume, virtues must arise from our intellectual faculties and arguably arise necessarily. Hume believes that natural virtues occur naturally in man, are a natural 'disposition', and result in good. He argues that suppressing inclinations will result in pain, while enabling them will result in pleasure. In a 'happy state', justice is not impossible, only unnecessary. Therefore, it could be argued that justice is a natural virtue.

Even in the ‘happy state’, it is not difficult to imagine a situation where two people may wish for the same thing, a particular unique view or time spent with a particular person. Walking to your favorite view to find it occupied by another person may lead one to decide that the just thing to do would be to leave them to it. Justice, and other artificial virtues, poses a further problem. Hume argues that the virtue of an action depends on the motive rather than the action itself. The judgment of whether an action is virtuous is based on motive, not the virtue of the act itself. Acting kindly because it is deemed virtuous is not truly virtuous.

Hume argues that returning a large fortune to a miser or a seditious bigot can harm society. When repaying the miser, one is motivated by duty rather than virtue, doing what is "right" out of obligation. This implies that justice may not be considered a virtue. In discussing the contrast between natural and artificial virtues, it is evident that the line between the two is not always distinct.

In this discussion, I have examined Hume's rationale for distinguishing between different types of virtue and the criteria he employs. I have also explored the challenges his theory faces, particularly in relation to the artificial virtues, such as justice, which may not neatly fit into distinct categories from natural virtues. The issue of circularity not only complicates the differentiation between virtues but also raises doubts about whether justice qualifies as a virtue at all. Although this does not definitively discredit Hume's distinction, it does cast doubt on the solidity of its foundation.