Problem Introduction
Previously, drilling had been majoritively close to shore, but as we’ve industrialized, deepwater offshore drilling has become more normalized. With the introduction of new technologies, accidents can be prominent if not handled delicately (Roberts 132). Antonio Juhasz describes the setup of deepwater drilling in novel “Black Tide,” writing, “Imagine a giant bag of popcorn, fresh from a microwave oven, waiting to be opened. Now bury it under 5,000 feet of ocean and 13,500 feet of earth. Instead of ripping the bag open, you insert an 18,500-foot straw in the form of the pipe and then place your thumb over the top to keep the contents from exploding out. The air in the bag is the gas, the popcorn in the crude oil, and the thumb is the cement job temporarily sealing the hole” (25). The oil industry’s intemperate nature has led to discouraging outcomes.
One of the pressing negative effects of oil in the ocean has been its impact on marine life. From ruining the insulation of fur-bearing mammals to destroying the water repellency of feathers on birds, the forthcoming problems are extensive and significant. Animals battle these circumstances by attempting to clean themselves, in which they then subsequently ingest the poison. Aquatic life continues to face problems further, in that fish exposed to this toxic product show signs of reduced growth, enlarged livers, modified heart and respiration rates, fin erosion, and fertility issues, along with problems keeping their young alive (NOAA). The cleanup of the material poses its own problems. The use of dispersants can have negative effects and initiate a breakdown of the food web. Minuscule plankton are more exposed to the chemicals and hence are their predators as well, as the oil is broken down into tiny droplets. This initiates concern that such predators further along in the food chain, such as whales and dolphins, could potentially starve (Roberts 135). Such complications, and a vast extension, were unbridled due to the magnitude of the BP oil spill in 2010.
Disaster Overview
Juhasz interviewed many people to unravel what happened the day of the spill in his book. The BP-leased Deepwater Horizon drilling rig, owned and operated by Transocean, exploded on April 20, 2010 on the Macondo Prospect. It is labeled and known as the largest oil spill in the history of the United States. Eleven workers’ lives were lost this day (14). The disaster began with an overflow of mud onto the rig floor, erupting within the derrick. Though activated, the blowout preventer (BOP) remained idle. Ignited by the gas, a couple explosions lit up the derrick, leading oil with it (45). The emergency disconnect system (EDS) also did not act when triggered (60). The rig succumbed to expansive flames and smaller explosions. The following urgencies included saving the rig and holding in the oil as much as possible by doing so, but they were not successful. The Deepwater Horizon sank and descended 5,000 feet, enabling even more spillage (97). The leakage consisted of 80,000 barrels of oil and 30,000 barrels of gas a day (99). Over the course of 87 days, 205.8 million gallons of crude oil was released into the Gulf Coast, affecting the nearby communities, the marine life, and the ocean quality immensely, and the companies’ responses to their mess was problematic.
Preceding and Proceeding Corruption
Juhasz continues to explain the background of BP’s decisions that preceded the disaster. The BP oil spill was not one stroke of bad luck, but was a result of a chain of bad decisions. For hindsight, since 2008, 73% of the incidents that caused federal investigation in the Gulf were of Transocean, who only operated less than half of the operating rigs (29). Five days leading up to the spill, this corporation, the fourth-largest in the world, was over $90 million over their budget and 45 days behind schedule (32). The company traded safety for money. The well design was modified three times within one day and the government regulators approved every single one, even within minutes of looking it over. The final blueprint cut $7-10 million dollars (33). When Halliburton was hired by BP to cement Macondo oil, they further did a poor job to already questionable specifications, by using the wrong oil and nitrogen foam, not typically used for deepwater drilling (34). BP and Halliburton were aware of results in March indicating the cement mixture would be unstable, but neither directed action on this knowledge. The oil field service contractor, Schlumberger, was given the job to test the cement installation done by Halliburton. It’s uncertain exactly why the test didn’t ensue, but the Schlumberger employees instead left the rig. This could be because BP made an executive decision that they didn’t need to be tested and sent the test workers home. It’s also possible, and rumored on discussion boards, that Schlumberger inferred the well was going to blow and ordered a shutdown that BP refused. Both BP and Schlumberger testify that option one entailed what happened (40). Forty minutes prior to the explosion, alarms should’ve went off and alerted the workers of gas leakage. The alarms didn’t go off because workers were instructed to keep them on bypass, since all Transocean fleets kept alarms on bypass as to not wake crew members up for false alarms (47). The EDS and BOP that didn’t work were supposed to be recertified every 5 years, and Deepwater Horizon’s were on year 10. Backup batteries had been allowed to run down and didn’t work (60). Panic ensued the day of drill, as BP had no escape drills or plans of action if a blowout did happen. It seems that every instance a corner could be cut, it had been.
In the coming months, BP showed no signs of accountability or responsibility. They fervently attempted make the actual numbers regarding spill rates unavailable to the public as an attempt to not be charged as much as they should for restitutions, and as well to save face (100). When they did submit reports, they were not of high quality. Their internal investigation was about 200 pages long but consisted of large fonts, wide spacing, oversized borders, and repeated information that could just have easily been condensed into a ten page paper (94). BP lied about the capacity they were able to handle for a spill as well as the amount of spillage that actually occurred, claiming the worst it could get was 162,000 barrels of oil a day but that they had the ability to handle double that (101). In addition, when the state bird of Louisiana, the brown pelican which had only gotten off the endangered list one year prior, was captured on film coated and blinded by oil, the images were given high effort to be hidden from the public (117).
Another issue in the timeline of the spill was political. The Obama administration expanded offshore drilling significantly, but did not expand the Minerals Management Service capacities in the case of a disaster. Out of the 4,000 Gulf wells, only 62 inspectors were tasked with overseeing all of them (357). Government regulators did not stress the need for oil companies to have safety standards or emergency plans in case of a blowout, hence the outcome of BP oil being caught absolutely unprepared.
Exigency for Change
The extent of the mismanagement displayed by BP and the government hasn’t even scratched the surface in this report. BP oil has shown a culture of cutting corners for saving money and gambling the chances for wrong turns. The direct use of their resources was for damage control rather than preventative safety measures. When interviewed, other oil companies pleaded that BP was a lone worker and that the industry as a whole isn’t flawed, which is doubtful (Juhasz 432) BP’s lack of a system to trace responsibility also caused problems, and the debate still stands who is to blame. Is there anyone to point a finger at, or is the industry as a whole flawed? One could argue that capitalism and the greed for endless growth pushed executives to attempt for more than they could handle. One could also argue that anyone who takes advantage of the cheap oil and supports the industry is to blame.
Regardless of who is to blame, we need to be better. Weaning the US off of nonrenewable energy is crucial, not only for spill impacts but for climate change urgencies additionally. The oil industry obviously needs more regulations that the government shouldn’t budge on because of any conflicts of interest. This dangerous poison that is being handled at such large capacities has to have a standard that isn’t compromised for monetary gain. It’s pitiful that BP continued to dodge the reparations that they deserved to pay, and if oil companies can’t provide information about the level of oil being spilled, the estimates shouldn’t be low-balled, but rather over exaggerated. Improvement can be found with people using their voice and voting for politicians who they believe will help us move towards renewable energy and away from the corruption of the oil industry.
It is also important to remain aware that there are wider, though less-flashy problems plaguing our oceans. Far outweighing the amount of sea life killed by oil is the amount of sea life killed by fishing gear. The total amount of marine life destroyed by Deepwater Horizon is topped even further by the Gulf of Mexico’s fishing fleets in a single day. Though the BP oil spill was a devastating amount of oil, careless drilling doesn’t account for the majority of oil in the ocean, but rather land runoff and jet/boat fuel are responsible for ⅔ of the oil in the ocean. (Roberts 135) It’s easy to demonize the oil industry, but along with the need for the government to step up, to change this reality, individuals all need to do what they can to advocate for renewable energy and make changes in their own life to be more sustainable.
