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In book 1 of the Politics Aristotle introduces a discussion of the household, which he views as consisting of three essential relationships: master and slave, husband and wife and parent and child. His consideration of slavery is based not merely on its utility but also in terms of its justification. For Aristotle, the instruments of the household form its stock of property. These instruments can be either animate or inanimate but are intended for action rather than production. The slave is therefore classed as an animate instrument and thus is classified as the property of his master.
As Aristotle puts it, "Anybody who by his nature is not his own man, but another's, is by his nature a slave.
" Aristotle then expands on this definition by offering an analogy for the relationship of master and slave. For Aristotle believes that there is a principal of rule and subordination in nature as a whole, especially in the realm of animate creation. This helps him to counteract suggestions that slavery is unjust, since "the relation of ruler and ruled is one of those things which are not only necessary but also beneficial.
By virtue of this principle, the soul rules the body and this rule is that of a master (as opposed to the rule, within the soul, of reason over emotion, which he classes as that of the statesman or monarch. )
This same rule can be observed in the relation between man and animal and the relation between natural master, who possesses the rational faculty of the soul, and natural slave, who possesses only bodily powers and the faculty to understand the directions given by another's' reason1 but has no ability for reasoning in himself.
It is thus clear that, just as some are by nature free, so others are by nature slaves, and for these latter the condition is both beneficial and just" (1254b39). Aristotle's doctrine of natural slavery has often been criticised as being presented purely to justify the commonly accepted ideology and practised institution of slavery that existed in his time2 and thus suffers from bias. Indeed elsewhere, Aristotle does seem concerned to always ground his philosophy in "reputable opinions".
However it is clear in this discussion that Aristotle does not utilize an endoxic method. Indeed he refers dismissively to other views on slavery "that are nowadays supposed true" (1253b17). As Smith writes, "a defence of slavery solely on pragmatic grounds was not all that Aristotle sought to achieve, for such an argument could have been offered without most of the moral and metaphysical considerations Aristotle imports to assist him in this theory. 3 It is therefore necessary to try and assess Aristotle's doctrine fully and not disregard it as purely dependent on the cultural climate of ancient Greece.
Aristotle's consideration of slavery can be criticised for inconsistency; in Politics book 7, he advocates the use of emancipation as a reward for the good slave (1330a32), however this contradicts the idea that the slave is by nature a slave and thus to free them from the state to which nature has placed them would be wrong.
However Aristotle can defend himself here, since the master is not required to feel any moral responsibility to the slave. Since the nature of the despotic rule of master to slave is characterised as being solely in the interests of the master, with any benefit that the slave receives being accidental (1278b32-7). Indeed presumably any friendship that might exist between master and slave could be characterised as one of utility, with the master benefiting from the slave's service in exchange for the slave gaining from having a master.
However the suggestion that a master might utilise a steward to employ the slaves (1255b35) is more troubling, since the steward would himself be a slave. How therefore would he be a fit master, since presumably he would not have the capacity of reason that allows a master to know how to use slaves. While it might be argued that the steward could first take his orders from the master and thus not be exercising reason but merely recognising it, his position does still seem troubling. Indeed it is difficult to know why Aristotle introduces the possibility at all.
However while we may find these internal difficulties with the argument, the biggest concerns seem to be regarding the nature of the slaves themselves, since according to Aristotle, they can have a share in virtue (1259b21-), a characteristic according to Aristotle in the Ethics that requires some form of reason (1106b36-). Despite Aristotle's modelling of the master:slave relationship on that of soul:body, Fortenbaugh finds it easier to view the relationship that would have as its model reason:emotion in the soul itself; even though this latter relationship is classified as a regal rule by Aristotle (1254b5). Aristotle denies them [slaves] the logical or reasoning half of the bipartite soul but not the alogical or emotional half. This means that slaves can make judgements involved in emotional responses and therefore have at least a minimum share in the cognitive capacity However Fortenbaugh feels compelled to do this because otherwise slaves would be precluded from being human at all.
As Smith notes, Fortenbaugh's explanation of the psyche of the natural slave would help relieve some of the earlier problems made regarding Aristotle's argument. For example, so long as the slave can comprehend the reasoned explanations of his master, there is no reason to suppose that he cannot engage in modestly responsible activities, such as stewardship. "5 However Smith's belief that the argument could be extended into justifying manumission does not seem quite as sound, "Through sufficient exposure to his master's reason, the natural slave - however naturally a slave - might conceivably be able to earn his freedom.
For if the slave were able to grasp reason from his master and thus subsequently be able to live not as a slave, then his enslavement in the first place would be unjust. For indeed his character is not like that of Aristotle's natural slave who is incapable of reason, but like the child who has yet to develop it. As Schofield informs us, "the crucial difference, he might say, between a child and a natural slave is that the child can and normally will acquire strategic purposes of his own (even if his present capacity for deliberation is very underdeveloped), but the natural slave never can. "
Expound and assess Aristotle's doctrine of natural slavery. (2020, Jun 02). Retrieved from https://studymoose.com/expound-assess-aristotles-doctrine-natural-slavery-new-essay
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