Moral Obligations in End-of-Life Care: A Delicate Balance

The discussion between "Is There a Duty to Die" and "A Duty to Care Revisited" delves into the ethical responsibility of caregivers and the elderly or ill individuals when life becomes overwhelming. Cohn and Lynn advocate for caring for the dying and giving them their space, while Hardwig argues that those who are dying should feel obligated to pass away in order to prevent placing a burden on their loved ones. A middle ground is proposed, where the decision should be made jointly by the dying individual and their family.

While the right to life is crucial, there may be instances where it is more morally sound to pass away rather than causing distress to caregivers and family members.

John Hardwig argues that individuals have a moral obligation to reject life-prolonging treatment and create advance directives refusing such treatment, even in the face of a life-threatening illness or a desire to continue living. He believes that our decisions not only affect ourselves but also impact our loved ones, and that our responsibility to them should take precedence over our individual right to life.

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Hardwig also contends that if the cost of medical care for a dying person is excessively burdensome for their family and the benefits are minimal, there is a moral duty to end one's life in order to alleviate this financial strain. To support his argument, he cites examples such as Captain Oates and an 87-year-old woman with congestive heart failure.

During an expedition to the South Pole, Captain Oates fell too ill to continue and it was clear he would not survive the journey or make it back home.

Despite his team's efforts to help him recover, he silently left the tent one night during a blizzard.

The debate between Cohn and Lynn, who believe his crew had a duty to care for him, and Hardwig, who argues he had a duty to die to save his team, raises the question of moral obligations in life and death situations. While Hardwig acknowledges the circumstances play a role in determining moral obligations to die, I find the term "obligated" too harsh when discussing matters of life and death. It may be more morally justifiable to sacrifice oneself for the benefit of loved ones, but to claim someone is morally obligated to die goes against the fundamental right to life. Overall, stating that one is morally obligated to die is inherently morally incorrect.

The 87-year-old woman with congestive heart failure had the option to pass away, which I find morally acceptable. However, she chose to continue living despite grim prognosis from doctors and insisted on aggressive treatment. Her quality of life declined due to constant treatments but she defied the odds and lived for almost two years. It is worth noting that her daughter made significant sacrifices - including her savings, home, job, and career - to care for her during this time.

It is debatable whether the daughter suffered more from her mother's decision to live two more years instead of choosing to die, but it cannot definitively be said that the mother had a duty to die. The daughter was not obligated to care for her mother as it was ultimately her choice. It may have been selfish of the mother to ask for financial support, but the daughter had the right to refuse if unable to provide. Both made choices that were not morally obligatory. The mother may have taken advantage of her daughter's love, but it is unclear if the daughter was emotionally prepared for her loss. It is possible that the daughter wanted to prolong her mother's life as much as possible, though this cannot be confirmed; therefore, it cannot be claimed that she was obliged to provide for her mother.

Cohn and Lynn argue against encouraging an obligation to die, believing instead in the importance of caring for the dying (103). They challenge Hardwig's perspective on the emotional toll on families, noting that survivors often experience trauma and guilt even in cases of "justifiable" suicide. Family members may struggle with feelings of grief and remorse, regardless of their understanding of the situation. There is no clear solution for how to navigate these complex emotions, as evidenced by the example of the daughter of the 87-year-old woman with congestive heart failure, who would likely feel regret if she had chosen not to fund her mother's treatment.

People often underestimate the time they have with loved ones, even if it is limited. Providing money for her mother made the woman realize that no amount of money can compare to a life. If her mother had been suffering and unaware of her surroundings, it might have been easier for the woman to refuse funding for medications. However, her mother was conscious and functional, and above all, she wanted to live. Who has the right to deny her that? I don't think anyone does.

Although each family has its own unique dynamics, suggesting that a family member should die to save money crosses a boundary of intrusiveness. Hardwig comes close to implying that life can be quantified with a monetary value. While he attempts to justify this by acknowledging the uniqueness of each situation, I firmly believe that no circumstance justifies obligating someone, especially a family member, to sacrifice their life. It is much more challenging in reality than in theory to make such a decision. After considering the perspectives of Hardwig, Cohn, and Lynn, I find myself positioned somewhere in between or completely outside their viewpoints. I reject the idea that anyone should be compelled to die, regardless of their health or age. Every individual has the fundamental right to life, and that right should never be taken away.

Works Cited
Cohn, Felicia, and Joanne Lynn. "A Duty to Care Revisited." Ethics in Practice: An Anthology (2007): 103-13. Web. Hardwig, John. "Is There a Duty to Die." The Hastings Center Report 2nd ser. 27 (1977): 34-42. JSTOR. Web.