This report seeks to discuss the essential differences in between the NASA (North American South American) and EROW (Europe and rest of world) sales efficiency over the previous 9 months. There are a number of factors triggering the sales efficiency figures presently stemming from NASA to be matchless with the EROW numbers, including the existing practice of moving large amounts of routine butyl rubber from the Sarnia to the Antwerp production centers.
As Polysar runs worldwide, it is also crucial to consider specific global elements and particular dangers.
These consist of, foreign currency exchange fluctuations, possibly creating gains or losses, as well as international taxes and tariffs. The choices made relating to allocation of earnings between the 2 geographic centers will directly impact the taxes paid in either place.
A top-level summary of Polysar Limited supplies an all-inclusive image of the nature of this case, required to later on successfully focus in on particular monetary information and problems. Polysar is Canada’s biggest chemical business, with the North American production facility located in Sarnia Ontario.
The business splits into 3 main groups consisting of petrochemicals, varied items, and rubber, of which the latter is the largest representing 46% of sales.
This rubber division is the core of the report, as its success is important to Polysar. The rubber department is divided into two geographic centers, in Sarnia Ontario and Antwerp Belgium respectively. (See Appendix 1 for graphical representation). Both geographical centers produce both regular butyl and halobutyl rubbers. In 1985, Sarnia opened a second production center that has not yet reached capability.
By comparison, Antwerp has only one center operating at complete capability and still not able to fulfill demand for regular butyl rubber. To handle this, the Sarnia transfers big quantities of its production to Antwerp at cost.
The inability of the Sarnia facility to earn a profit from these transferred units represents one of the main causes of concern regarding sales performance figures. In order to correctly and efficiently asses the current situation, we will be reviewing a number of criteria, and from there introduce and analyze several alternatives presented by these assessments.
As you are aware, the NASA segment is currently charging EROW for the butyl rubber being transferred in order to meet the European demand. This charge is currently calculated on the basis of NASA’s cost. This is only one of three possible approaches that are used to set to transfer prices internally within Polysar Limited. The three options that may be considered are:
1. Set transfer prices at cost
2. Set transfer prices at a negotiated mutually agreed upon level 3. Set transfer prices at the market value Currently, as the first option is implemented, this is causing the two major problems. The first is in regards to the product mix produced within the Sarnia production facilities. As no profit is recorded for the units that are transferred, the product mix may be decided on a sub-optimal basis.
Our team recommends further investigation to determine the necessary information as to if the costs to produce the halobutyl and butyl rubbers within both NASA and EROW. This could lead to decisions of specialization in the Sarnia plants or Antwerp plant for one type of rubber produced if cost savings for that product line is higher than transportation costs of shipping to the other facility.
Additionally, another problem being experienced through the current transfer pricing approach is that the NASA does not show any profit on the Polysar internal transfer of rubber. Consequently, the EROW segment may record this profit without the same having the additional fixed costs pertaining to the costly initial investment of the second Sarnia plant amounting $550 million and the associated depreciation. This leads to an unfair representation of profitability for the two cost centers.
In terms of which to use for Polysar Limited’s Rubber Segment, setting prices at cost hereby benefits the EROW center, whereas using market price would benefit the NASA segment. This is because then NASA is recording revenue for the units transferred, whereas EROW will not, (provided that the prices in both markets are similar – international arbitrage).
With Polysar’s company wide profitability in mind, as well as spirit of fairness in representation for both segments using a de-centralized approach, our recommendation is the use of negotiated transfer pricing. This occurs when the NASA and EROW segments collaborate to agree on a selling/purchasing price for the internationally transferred butyl supply. Implementing this will cause both segments to have better information of the costs and benefits associated with the transfer.
To narrow down on what this transfer price should specifically be, a range of acceptable transfer prices will provide an estimate. As this is an international transfer, there are even more considerations that become relevant. For example, the corporate tax rate applied in North American versus Europe should be considered. Furthermore, management should look specifically into duties, tariffs, foreign exchange rates and risks, as well as governmental relationships. By this token, charging Antwerp a lower transfer price will result in fewer Custom Duty payments as the rubber crosses borders.
Currently Polysar employs a static budget system for their budgeted level of rubber sales. However, if more butyl or halobutyl rubber is produced and then sold these will cause a variance as composed to budgeted figures. For example, variable costs will go up, however this may simply be in direct correlation to the increased rubber produced.
It is important to be able to analyze if variances are based on volume or cost differences. By tracing the cost variances more closely after implementing this flexible budget system, a better evaluation of management’s performance may be achieved. This can be directly used when considering compensation for managers.
Polysar uses the participative budgetary system, which is directly linked to employee compensation. Although this bottom-up approach to budgeting allows for accurate estimates due to managers with specific rubber cost knowledge being involved, it can cause a conflict of interest that may be costly. It is essential, and highly recommended that the NASA rubber division establish a budgetary committee to review the estimates made to ensure the lower level management has not added in budgetary slack intentionally in an effort to achieve their compensation figures based on meeting these targets.
However, even the top management currently possesses a huge conflict of interest influencing them in the direction of allowing for budgetary slack as their compensation is up to 50% for both meeting divisional profits, as well as exceeding corporate profit targets. These targets can clearly be met, if costs have been artificially manipulated to be higher than expected.
As it is improbable to find members of the budgetary committee who will be completed impartial and not subject to a bonus on the premise of meeting profit targets, responsible accounting should be implemented. This system holds each manager responsible for the estimate of the individual cost and revenue basis for which he or she was in charge of deciding. This means, he or she is essentially responsible to explain the differences between the actual and budgeted results.
In order to negate the previously mentioned conflict of interest, it is recommended to include the amount of variance in a manager’s estimate in the calculate of compensation, hereby eliminated large bonuses if the original estimate was not within a certain range of the actual value (extra-ordinary occurrences excluded).
The nature of the Polysar’s business contains a certain degree of specialized risk. First and foremost, operating internationally in various currency zones contributes to foreign exchange risk. This can be hedged through capital markets, resulting in lowering risk for the corporation.
Also, as there is a great degree of risk for the variable costs of production in relation to the oil, it is imperative to hedge this risk as well. It is very possible to hedge market commodity price risks through capital markets or advance purchase of these oil inputs. This can provide more stability for Polysar Limited as a whole, particularly the key rubber division.