The U.S. Army ROTC which stands for Reserve Officers’ Training Corps is by far the best of the leadership courses throughout the country and is part of most colleges’ curriculum. The learning involves such practices which enables you to understand what it required to lead others, take up missions and motivate your fellow mates as an active Officer of the Army. Once graduated, the cadet earns the position of a Second Lieutenant and would be part of the Active Army, Army National Guard or the Army Reserve and become a discoverer for lifetime.
The United States Armed Forces and numerous other national militaries, specially the countries having firm historic ties with the United States have implemented Reserve Officers’ Training Corps programs. Philippines implemented this in 1912 while Korea started ROTC in 1963.
The ROTC contributes to all departments of the U.S. Armed forces except for U.S. Coast Guards. All in all it contributes towards 56% of the whole U.S. Army out of which; 11% are to US Marines, 41% to US Air Force and 20% of US Navy.
The combined figures for the ROTC contribution of active duty officers towards the United States Department of Defense accounts to 39% which is a notable figure. Philippines’ ROTC Alumni Association acknowledges that 75% of the officer corps for Armed Forces in Philippines adds up from ROTC programs.
Except for the US Coast Guard each of the U.S. Armed Forces offers keen scholarships to ROTC participant students on merit basis. They even offer scholarships in exchange for periods of active military service.
For instance, students who opt for an Army ROTC scholarship agree to dispense a four year period of military service with the Army after college. Army and Airforce ROTC students are cited as cadets where Naval ROTC students are called midshipmen as these terms concur with their particular services in the military academy that they carry out. US Navy and US Marine Corps both are licensed by the Naval ROTC program whereas the Coast Guard guarantor only the JROTC program.
Army ROTC squads are orchestrated into companies, battalions and brigades. Similarly, Air Force ROTC units are divided into wings, squads or wings just like the active Air Force. Naval ROTC units are carved up as naval battalions. Usually, naval ROTC units are formed into Naval battalions but having the Navy educatees in sections and divisions like a ship, and the Marines in a different company is only exercised when an ROTC unit has ample amount of members to justify an extra division.
Senior Army leaders are keen of the idea that perception is actually reality. Black representation and resultant progress in the combat arms branches of the US Army is deplorably lacking. Recruiting blacks into combat arms is diminutive whereas the Black combat arms officers who elevate on higher leadership and command positions at battalion and brigade command level or higher are relics at best. This is also historic fact that the selected few Blacks for senior operational commands at the battalion or division level are generally placed out of view from the American public and the African American youth without fail. Figures say that across the past thirty years only two of nine black men were taken upto command Army Divisions and that also they have been intended to do so in Conus. It is a fact that Black men and women can derive aspiration in pursuance of a given career, by seeing someone of their own ethnicity in placements of high authority, but Black Battalion Commanders have always remained persona non grata in percepts of the Black youth. The US army in turn lays no significant emphasis on dealing with the impact of black combat officers. Charles C. Moskos states that Blacks occupy more management positions in the military than in any other sector of American society.
The incorporation of Blacks into the Army is a sensational story worth simulating; the Army figures show that Blacks do not take parts equally all around career fields. Especially Blacks are under-represented in the combat arms; the circumstance can be named as occupational segregation. U.S. Army’s leaders and authorities are touched on about the low count of Black officers functioning in the combat arms for two causes. First, the low count of Blacks in the combat arms cuts down the diverseness and perhaps the believability of the U.S. Army’s authority. Second, it proves to be unmanageable for Blacks to achieve appropriate internal representation among general officers because 72% of the U.S. Army’s generals are picked out from the combat arms.
Three-quarters of all Black officers are licensed by ROTC whereas majority of them are licensed by HBCU’s (Historically Black College and Universities). Researches reveal that there were two leading factors that influenced the assignments of Black cadets and those were cadet performance as well as attitude towards service. As a result, black HBCU cadets compete appropriately in on-campus ROTC scores but are indisposed when it comes to Advanced Camp. Black cadets were less probable to regard the Army as fair and had a most negative perceptual experience about the combat arms branches. Moreover, Black cadets are also deficient when it comes to combat arms mentors to cater for the needed motivation, tutorship and counseling.
The US Army must set out to extenuate these factors and inverse the under-representation of Black military officers in combat arms. Thus, to enhance the internal representation of Black officers, the Army must coach HBCU cadets to do a cut above at Advanced Camp and prepare HBCU cadets for the needs and unparalleled culture of the Army and furthermore, delegate more Black officers into combat arms branches to allow for more mentors for Black cadets and officers in the time to come.
Equal opportunity was not constantly interpreted as it is today. Formerly Army directives allowed for segregation. Ever since the desegregation of the Armed Forces, the Army has efficaciously broadened their ranks as the Army acts as mannequin for other organizations to follow up on. The Blacks comprise 29% of the total Army and just 11% of all Army officers. Nonetheless, a more closelipped look at Army officer statistics points that some inequalities have existence.
Nowadays, the argument is not about adequate remuneration and intervention. But the main concern is the statistical distribution of Black officers amongst the Army. The amount of Black officers in combat arms offsets of the Army is minuscule, while the amount of Black officers engaging non-combat arms emplacements is heavy and developing unevenly. A deliberate study of the demographics by vocational specialty suggests that most Black officers in the Army are based in combat support and combat military service support branches.
Various considerations add to making the uneven distribution. One of the causes is the rate of progression of Black officers with their white counterparts. Counterpointing causes arise from circumstances that are present outside the Army and result from the aftermaths of sociable and ethnical determines. Nevertheless, the failure to access Black officers into the Army’s combat arms occupations is a serious institutional concern. Several studies in recent years have attempted to shed some light on this issue. A good example of inequality between combat and non-combat departments is exemplified by Army Infantry demographics which says that the percentage of Blacks in the Infantry has dropped a great deal from 30% in 1980 to 15% presently, while the count of Blacks in logistics units nowadays often are more than 50%. In 1999, only one Black cadet was accessed into the Infantry by the United States Military Academy.
Reports suggest that Black American students rate the grandness of earning high financial gain and contributing to society (Walpole, Bauer, Gibson, Kanyi, & Toliver, 2002). Another study by Morgan Teng and Anderson (2001) about Black American community college students depicts that job protection, a good starting income, self-reliance, and a crucial position are more crucial to Black American students comparably to White students. In addition, a crave of serving others and the society is also a significant motif in Black American culture. Nevertheless, some researches endure that particularly looks into differences of opinion amongst Black American and White educatees concerning the dominance of future income, future position, college attendance and vocational choices. Moreover, Black American persons proceed to go through high values of educational shortfalls, employment stagnancy, and impoverishment in the United States of America (Hargrove and Pope-Davis, 2001). Altogether we hope is that looking into the influence of future income, status and stimulating a difference in community will lead to significances favorable in assisting Black American students in finishing high school, going to college, and arriving at a career choice.
Researches depict that a Black cadet’s entrée into combat arms offsets is ascertained into a prominent part by two components: cadet functioning and cadet mental attitude towards service. African HBCU cadets contend befittingly with other cadets when it pertains to on-campus ROTC grades but they perform badly at Advanced Camp. A cadet’s performance is most importantly a derivative of the personal attitude towards service.
The Army needs to lay complete and prompt attention to training HBCU cadets better. Conditioning plus formulation on campus starts with attaining a satisfactory GPA. Secondly, the ROTC cell must be knowledgeable adequately to render quality conditioning for HBCU cadets. Conditioning must be concentrated on the vital performance areas the cadet is assessed at camp such as traits like management, navigation, and APFT.
The program must also ascertain that HBCU Cadets incur coaching to gear them up for the shift in organizational surroundings they will come upon at Advanced Camp. The HBCU Cadets need to have early experiences in adjusting to a more structured organizational stage setting. The cadets must learn to adjust ahead of the time when he arrives at Advanced Camp. ROTC plans have in the past times carried on speciated conditioning and training to prepare cadets for functioning in various environments.
This particular training had better be reevaluated for its value and re-established. Cadets can suffer from “culture shock” during the early days of the camp if they are not trained or carried along without this kind of preparation or training. Squad leaders and contrivers must supervise internal representation. Discouraging to leaders and contrivers will be the extended dialogue over distinguishing the suitable military representation levels of citizen groupings. The demand for plentiful figures of quality staff personnel within the Army necessitates belief on all demographic and societal sections of America. Suitable action in reception to statistic trends is essential to preserve and amend the force. The Army ought to enhance the count of Black combat arms officers teaching Black cadets. Standard Black combat arms officers capable to provide a positive example to cadets will extremely aid in impeding vocational separatism of Blacks in non-combat arms offshoots. The occupancy of these eminent officers will also encourage mentoring of cadets that will amend the mental attitude cadets possess of the Army and ROTC.