Lenin: Dictator or Reactor?

The interpretation of historians like Pipes and Volkogonov is that Lenin was a dictator, as indicated by his implementation of policies like War Communism and the establishment of the Cheka. Nevertheless, their historical narratives can be disputed due to their subjective perspectives. Conversely, other historians like Hill argue that Lenin was not a dictator because his policies were forced upon him by the Russian circumstances. Therefore, Lenin cannot be classified as a dictator since he was simply reacting to the challenging Russian circumstances and had the capability to employ adaptable measures like NEP.

Lenin's centralization of the state by 1924 led to him being perceived as a dictator. This perception arose from the establishment of a one-party dictatorship in Soviet Russia and the dominance of government institutions by the Bolshevik organization, the Politburo. Additionally, Lenin's decision to create a new governing body called the Sovnakom instead of utilizing the existing Soviet as the main governing entity indicated his unwillingness to share power with other socialist groups.

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The Sovnakom exercised ruling power through decrees without seeking approval from the Soviet, further consolidating the authority of the Bolsheviks. Therefore, the centralization of the state in Russia can be regarded as dictatorial as it curtailed the political influence of other groups and bolstered the influence of the Bolsheviks, with Lenin as its chair.

According to Pipes, the consolidation of power facilitated Lenin's establishment of a "one-party dictatorship"1. Pipes suggests that Lenin's party served as a precursor to future mass-based dictators, highlighting the significance of his creation of the Sovnakom.

This indicates that Lenin's party governed Russia through dictatorial means. While there is some truth to this perspective, the formation of the Sovnakom demonstrated that decision-making primarily rested with the Bolshevik center, disregarding alternative political viewpoints. Nevertheless, Pipes' historical account is not entirely reliable due to his personal biases against Lenin and Communism. Additionally, circumstances beyond Lenin's control, such as the Civil War, necessitated his utilization of the Sovnakom instead of effectively collaborating with the Central Executive Committee.

The Politburo, considered a dictatorial institution, allowed Lenin to extend his dictatorship by gaining more power from the Sovnakom. As the leading decision-making body of the Communist Party, the Politburo increasingly assumed control over key decisions. Members of the Politburo were selected by the Central Committee. According to Volkogonov, there was never any discussion about the power of the Politburo, as state power was effectively transferred to this Party organ, serving as the main tool of the Bolshevik dictatorship. This historian suggests that through the Politburo, the Bolsheviks were able to rule Russia in a dictatorial manner, asserting their control and passing decrees without taking other political perspectives into account.

The belief that Lenin was a dictator due to his control over political power can be contested by some historians who argue that the establishment of the Sovnakom and the Politburo was necessary, imposed on Lenin as a result of the circumstances arising from the Civil War. It is unlikely that Lenin would have rapidly transitioned towards a highly centralized state if not for the economic chaos brought about by the Civil War in 1918. The circumstances of the war allowed for little time to consult with the Soviet and other governing bodies, leading to the need for quick emergency decisions and centralization of decision making. This perspective is reinforced by the fact that in Nizhniy-Novgorod, the local Mafia of black marketers who disregarded Moscow had full control.

The regime's utilization of the party structure to establish centralized control over government bodies and restore order amidst chaos is comprehensible. Lenin's actions during the Civil War were pragmatic reactions to imposed problems, rather than authoritarian decisions, as alternative options were lacking. In general, the concentration of power does not indicate Lenin's dictatorship; it was a practical response to the turmoil caused by the war. Towards his tenure's end, Lenin's declining health resulted in him losing control over the Politburo, leading to an alleged increase in dictatorial tendencies within it. Therefore, the responsibility for these actions lies with the Bolshevik party itself rather than with Lenin. Consequently, considering Lenin as a dictator would be unfounded.

Lenin has been considered a dictator by historians because of his implementation of the Red Terror, which was introduced after an assassination attempt on his life in 1918. This act is seen as dictatorial because it involved using force to gain more political control over Russian society. The Red Terror was then used against any form of political opposition, reflecting dictatorial practices. Pipes argues that the Red Terror was not just a reaction to others' actions but a proactive measure to eliminate potential resistance to the dictatorship. Therefore, this historian supports the idea that the Red Terror was employed to establish a dictatorship by suppressing political freedoms in Russia. The targets of the Red Terror were former officials, landlords, and priests who faced execution.

The Bolshevik Party authorities used violence to suppress any opposition they faced. Peasants who resisted the requisitioning of their crops or hoarded grain were often subjected to shootings. The regime also crushed industrial unrest. Recognizing the potential for opposition, the Bolshevik regime implemented the Red Terror as a means to address any resistance. As a result, some historians view this as a dictatorial measure. Volkogonov also perceives the Red Terror as a desperate attempt to maintain power regardless of the cost, believing that Lenin was willing to eliminate any Russian lives opposing him through physical terror or concentration camps.

Another reason why historians accuse Lenin of being a dictator is the creation of the CHEKA7. This institution was established to suppress any opposition to the regime. Historians argue that Lenin's handling of opposition through terrorist methods supports the notion that he acted as a dictator, showing no hesitation in resorting to "merciless" terror9.

Pipes argues that Lenin could be considered a dictator because he intended to resort to terror even before any organized opposition emerged. He illustrates this point by stating that the establishment of the "Red Terror's" primary enforcement entity, the secret police known as the CHEKA, occurred in December 1917, when there was no organized resistance against the new regime. As a result, it becomes evident that the CHEKA served primarily to uphold the Bolshevik government's grip on power and safeguard Lenin's authority.

Volkogonov supports the belief that Lenin relied on a "merciless dictatorship" to protect his authority and regime from opponents. This view suggests that Lenin's use of terror, exemplified by his orders against resisting rich peasants and the establishment of the CHEKA and Red Terror, was aimed at establishing more control over opposition in Russia. However, it is important to note that both Volkogonov and Pipes hold biased views. Pipes, an anti-Marxist, strongly dislikes Lenin, while Volkogonov, an ex-general in the Russian army, disapproves of Soviet policies. Therefore, their historical opinions should be challenged. Moreover, there are historical facts that suggest their argument is flawed.

The notion that Lenin employed terror solely for the purpose of enforcing his policies and establishing control has been called into question by other historians. They argue that the Red Terror was a temporary measure imposed on Lenin due to the circumstances and that it was not entirely his doing. Instead, they believe that the Red Terror was a response to the terror Lenin himself faced. Laver's perspective on the Red Terror is that it was a case of "Terror met Terror," referring to the Civil War during which both sides used terror as a tactic. For instance, Baron Wrangel, a White leader in Crimea, ordered the execution of 300 prisoners of war, while Green leader Antonov allowed his peasant army to bury alive captured communists. Therefore, this historian suggests that Lenin only appeared to be responding to the situations at hand and had no intention of suppressing political opposition. It should be noted that Lenin was not the sole user of terror; there were other political groups that employed similar tactics.

Hence, due to the threat he faced upon coming into power, Lenin found himself in a situation where he had to resort to using terror as a response. This perspective is also shared by other historians who believe that in order to protect his authority, Lenin had no choice but to use terror. Liebman further supports this view, stating that Lenin's main motive was to defend the Soviet power against counter revolutionaries. This need for terror can be traced back to 1917 when Lenin started facing opposition, both from within and outside of Russia. In fact, on November 10, 1917, the Morning Post in London called for military action against the Bolsheviks, and in October of the same year, Kerensky and General Krasnov attempted to gather an army in Petrograd.

Lenin faced opposition and a terror threat from the beginning of his power, leading him to respond with the Red Terror. This response was in reaction to the existing terror in Russia when he took power. The establishment of the Red Terror by Lenin was a result of threats from both internal sources in Russia and foreign intervention. Therefore, Lenin should not be considered a dictator since the purpose of the terror was not personal gain or controlling political opposition, but rather dealing with terrorist opposition, as any regime would.

The Service sees the use of the CHEKA as a temporary measure, in line with Lenin's belief that it would only be needed for a short period and not as part of a widespread campaign of terror. Lenin intended for the CHEKA to safeguard the newly established Bolshevik regime during its early stages and to secure its survival. Moreover, the role of the CHEKA diminished during the Civil War, further supporting its temporary nature.

Both the Red Terror and the CHEKA were implemented as a temporary solution to address the situation and were considered necessary institutions by the Bolsheviks in order to confront counter-revolutionary threats. Furthermore, any newly established government must protect itself against terrorist resistance. Hence, it would be inaccurate to classify Lenin as a dictator since he introduced a temporary measure in response to Russia's unique circumstances.

Lenin has been accused of being a dictator due to his implementation of the policy of War Communism. This policy, introduced by Lenin himself, aimed at centralizing control over production and distribution in areas under Bolshevik control. The dictatorial nature of this policy can be seen in its impact on workers' participation in factories, as Factory Committees lost their authority and Party officials took over. As a result, the Bolsheviks gained dominance over the economy. Additionally, War Communism involved forcefully requisitioning grain from rural peasants, which led to increased unrest. In response to this unrest, Lenin resorted to using terror tactics through the CHEKA to enforce these measures.

Volkogonov asserts that War Communism can be seen as dictatorial because of its harsh regulation. He points out that during this period, there was a severe food shortage in 1920 and a famine in 1921, resulting in the death of 10 million Russians. Volkogonov further argues that Lenin's approval of the state's dominance over society played a significant role in the implementation of War Communism. This implies that Lenin's attitude towards governance set the stage for the policies that turned him into a dictator. However, it is important to consider Volkogonov's background as an ex-general in the Russian army who was compelled to leave due to his anti-Leninist political stance. Thus, his views may be biased and should be taken with caution.

It is questionable whether War Communism was dictatorial because it can be argued that the control it exerted was necessary. This is because the factory committees lacked the expertise and experience needed to manage production for the Civil War, as well as the ability to organize supplies for the cities and Red Army.

Lenin's choices to implement War Communism can be seen as a response to temporary desperate necessities, as argued by Hill. This interpretation suggests that Lenin's actions were not driven by dictatorial intentions, but rather by the harsh economic problems at the time. Despite Hill's bias as a Marxist historian sympathetic to Lenin, his viewpoint is still credible due to the difficult conditions caused by the treaty of Brest Litovsk and the Civil War. Laver also supports the idea that War Communism was a desperate measure taken by the regime to ensure food supply for the towns. The collapse of production in Russia during this period was a result of severe disruptions in transportation and blockades imposed by the allies, preventing foreign trade from reaching communist territory, particularly Petrograd.

The population of Moscow and Petrograd was cut in half, with only 1.2 million of the 2.6 million workers in 1917 remaining by 192018. This necessitated a temporary state-controlled economy to ensure food supply and production during the Civil War. War Communism was a temporary measure that was replaced by the New Economic Policy after the Civil War, granting workers more freedom than before and providing peasants with newfound freedom. Laver, who maintains a neutral perspective on Lenin and the communist revolution, argues that War Communism was a response to the challenges faced by Russia and its policies were implemented gradually in response to the critical circumstances prevailing at the time.

In conclusion, according to Service, the economic problems compelled Lenin to implement the policies of War Communism. This was further reinforced by the intervention of the Civil War, which forced Lenin to take emergency measures. Service's viewpoint aligns with Hill and Laver, who also argue that Lenin's adoption of War Communism was influenced by the Civil War. In essence, Lenin cannot be easily labeled as a dictator due to his implementation of the policy of War Communism. This policy entailed imposing "emergency measures" on Lenin in response to declining production and the onset of the Civil War. Lenin did not intend to manipulate the economy for personal gain, as he was willing to restore political freedom once the Civil War concluded.

The introduction of the New Economic Policy (NEP) is considered by some historians as evidence of Lenin's dictatorial tendencies. They argue that in order to maintain his grip on power, Lenin implemented the NEP, which granted only limited economic freedom while imposing political constraints to safeguard against any potential loss of power.

Historians, like Pipes, criticize Lenin's motives for implementing NEP, suggesting that it was not intended to grant freedom but rather to retain power. According to Pipes, NEP was merely a temporary measure adopted to alleviate tension momentarily so that a subsequent aggressive action could be taken to eliminate the bourgeoisie permanently.21 To some extent, Pipes' perspective is accurate, given that the introduction of NEP coincided with stringent measures of political control, including a complete prohibition on all political parties except for the Bolsheviks.

This implies that Lenin was unwilling to compromise his power and maintained control over the "commanding heights" of the economy, indicating his lack of true intention to grant the promised freedom of NEP. Pipes also argues that the Bolsheviks considered the grain monopoly crucial for their survival as a communist dictatorship and needed to regain the loyalty of the peasants in order to establish their rule. However, this interpretation can be questioned as the Bolsheviks aimed to regain peasant loyalty for the purpose of improving agriculture and promoting industrial development. It should be noted that Pipes' perspective is biased due to his negative sentiment towards Lenin and Communism. As President Reagan's national security advisor on Soviet affairs during 1981-82, he holds a strong anti-Lenin stance, which raises doubts about his viewpoint.

Lenin's introduction of the NEP after War Communism demonstrated his willingness to grant freedom. This action illustrated that Lenin was far from being a dictator, as he allowed the peasantry newfound freedom and enabled the development of agriculture and trade in private hands. According to Service, the NEP provided the peasantry with greater legal freedom to trade grain, surpassing any previous opportunities available to them. This viewpoint is more convincing, as the NEP permitted the peasants to trade their remaining grain as they pleased. Therefore, the freedom granted to the peasants proves Lenin's lack of intention to act as a dictator.

The NEP serves as evidence that Lenin's rule cannot be characterized as dictatorial. It demonstrated his willingness to show flexibility and compromise on ideological principles, a trait uncommon among dictators. Moreover, the NEP successfully restored confidence in the Russian population, resulting in the return of workers and farmers to their respective occupations, ultimately benefiting the economy. Overall, the NEP is another testament to Lenin's divergence from dictatorial tendencies as he acknowledged the shortcomings of War Communism and presented an alternative approach that went against his own beliefs. In this way, the NEP serves as proof that Lenin cannot be viewed as a dictator, as it not only contributed to the enhancement of the Russian economy but also replaced an unsuitable temporary policy post Civil War.

Overall, Lenin did not have the intention of being a dictator. He simply responded to the circumstances that he faced. Although some of his responses may appear unsuitable, Lenin did retreat from certain actions, such as transitioning from War Communism to the New Economic Policy after the Civil War. Therefore, Lenin cannot be regarded as a dictator.

On page 506 of "The Russian Revolution" by R.Pipes

2 R.Pipes- The Three Whys of The Russian Revolution page 38

3 D.Volkogonov-Lenin Life and Legacy page 306

4 D.Volkogonov-Lenin Life and Legacy page 307

5

On page 237, D. Volkogonov discusses Lenin's life and legacy.

7 The Extra-ordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage was established in December 1917.

Page 236 of D. Volkogonov's book "Lenin's Life and Legacy" is referenced.

9 R.Pipes- Three Whys Of The Russian Revolution page 41

10 R.Pipes- Three Whys Of The Russian Revolution page 41

Page 472 of D. Volkogonov's book "Lenin Life and Legacy" provides insights on Lenin's influence.

The information on page 62 of the book "12 J.Laver- Lenin Liberator or Oppressor" is as follows:

On page 315, M. Liebman discusses Leninism during the time of Lenin.

14 R. Service- Lenin: A Biography (page 322).

According to D. Volkogonov in his book "Lenin Life and Legacy" on page 334,

Page 133 of C.Hill's book "Lenin and the Russian Revolution".

According to page 70 of 17 J. Laver's book "Lenin: Liberator or Oppressor", Lenin's impact is seen as both that of a liberator and oppressor.

18 P.Oxley- Russia from Tsars to Commissars- page 128.

The information can be paraphrased as follows while keeping the HTML tags and their contents: On page 70 of the book "J.Laver- Lenin Liberator or Oppressor", it discusses whether Lenin was a liberator or oppressor.

20 R. Service - Lenin: a Biography - page 430.

21 R.Pipes- The Russian Revolution- page

The page number for R. Pipes' book "The Russian Revolution" is 22.

23 R.Service-Lenin a Biography- page