Problem of Historical Knowledge
History is a like capsule and using on memories what affects our history, they realized, revisited, analysis. The claim of historical knowledge is the natural objective, scientific, but knowledge mathematically shares verifiable say some opinion with claim and knowledge verified demonstrable or falsification. The historical knowledge that mean subjective knowledge share/counter proof and individual, modernist pyridine, scientific pyridine and principle of religion goddess related enlighten sources which spread good opinion about the positive way/ Buddha, Mahavir and Valmiki etc.
by enlightment and rational pyridine. History is based on some points like: – Historical knowledge constructed based on the sources, data, metrical details, processing (epics, puran, Mahabharata, archeological connection bones of these sources:-portico, mysteries, paintings that’s support modern renascence).
Second is the collection of sources (data use what are you use data and collection which one authentic how to conceive that), British achieve/Indian achieve (contradictive sources processing of data).
Third is based on Cross the data, there is no history without resources. History is not reproduction of collection, collection and production, antiquarian interpretation. Fourth is based on Conceptual framework by element interpretation, apply your concern, there is no history without explanation economy, social, political phenomena without answer-Why there is no history? Fifth is based on the narrativisation how will you explain it? This is explain through the framing your answer, style methods different, Time and Narrative text/Hayden White by content of the form.
According to E.H.Carr, He explain “what is history” in own book, where he give a very most and very clear example in the book. History consists of a corpus of ascertained facts. The facts are available to the historian in documents, inscriptions and so on, like fish on the fishmonger’s slab. The historian collects them, takes them home, and cooks and serves them in whatever style appeals to him. Acton, whose culinary tastes were austere, wanted them served plain.
This book can be read in two parts. The first part looks into the material that creates history. By relating past historians to their specific context he argues that history is never a value free process but always colored by the relation between past, present and future. The second part of the book can be read as a motivational speech for using reason and the believe in progress to improve society and the individuals living in this society. Especially the last chapter feels contemporary in the issues raised, issues like the relation between advertisements and politics, techniques that target the irrational, the sifting of power centers etc. On the other hand Carrs optimism and believe in reason is refreshing and works as a humanist baptism in bringing past ideals to live.
As we know Carr quickly discredits the notion of history as a universal entity, lambasting Acton’s proposal of an “ultimate history” by indicating that such a concept imposes a complete separation between subject and object. The 19th century positivist claim that history is a pure science is a false conviction based not on reality but rather, as Carr calls it, a “cult of facts.” Factuality comprises merely one aspect of the historian’s task. To have meaning, facts must be properly analyzed and assembled by an individual, thereby adding an element of subjectivity to any historical finding. Data may be lost or incomplete; one historian’s rationale may differ from another’s; the causes of any particular event may not have been inevitable. In order to be scientific, history would necessarily need to possess postulates which apply universally and can be re-applied with the same results. Since no historical trend can be re-applied to produce exact results, we cannot ignore that there are other complicit factors in its make-up.
Keith Jenkins’ Re-Thinking History book; he wrote this book with the specific reason of introducing “deconstructionist” ideas into a usually conservative discipline. He is concerned with the lack of dialogue of concept in history circles and, when discussed, by way of its limiting scope. Keith Jenkins is satisfied that we live in a post-modern world, a world in which the whole thing is ideologically positioned and morally relative; where nothing is fixed and the whole lot is open to revision.
This book basically applies these insights to historiography. Keith Jenkins, who is essentially an expositor of the thoughts of Hayden White, is seen right here trying a popularization of a lot of Hayden White’s work. Needless to say he is relatively successful in this. Keith Jenkins affords these arguments in very readable and intelligible terms, and indicates that records are what historians do when they choose to understand the past. History and the past are two definitely specific things. The past is that which precedes us here in the present, and history is the way historians write about it. But due to the fact human beings are continually ideologically motivated and located in the present, authoring an objectively proper account of the previous is not possible due to the fact information need to be selected in an infinitely prosperous and inexhaustible world, making those data which come to be chosen ideologically-laden. Moreover, there is no way to compare the relative deserves of competing money owed of the past because the past itself is no longer an account, however a sequence of past events. Therefore, for the reason that there is no essentially correct “text” or account to which all different money owed can be compared, all we have are variants (interpretations) of the past, each equally groundless and ideological.
However, Hayden White argues that relativism is desirable because is serves as the basis for “social toleration and the positive recognition of differences”. Once we recognize that there is no such thing as a correct view of the past, we can begin to entertain seriously other interpretations that differ radically from ours both in the style of argument and in the conclusions reached. Relativism, White argues, should prevail because it promotes a respect for diversity and creativity. Keith Jenkins takes a “power struggle” view and argues that some positions are deemed more correct than others because they have managed to gain control of the power structures. Citing Foucault, Jenkins argues the “knowledge is related to power”, and that notions of truth are “dependent on somebody having the power to make it true. Truth and similar expressions are devices to open, regulate and shut down interpretations. Truth acts as a censor – it draws the line”. This is an interesting argument, and I found it persuasive.
Jenkins basic 1991 textual content about doing records in the postmodern world is, as the many endorsements in the front pages attest, valuable for its outstanding clarity in putting out why it matters that we provide up our common experience notion of history and assume significantly about the implications of post-modern and post-structural principle for doing historic work. It is a text that I would simply use to train undergraduates, and it is squarely aimed at on foot them, intelligently and sensibly, via their most probably reservations. (What about bias? What about empathy and having a ‘feel’ for the human beings you write about?) It is also useful, though, for those at extra advanced levels who are beginning to suppose about historiography and philosophy of history, laying out key questions and arguments in such a way that allow you to take your reading of Jenkins book with you as you begin reading Hayden White and others for yourself. For the intermediate or advanced scholar of history, there is very little that is new for you here, but it is a useful way to reference a whole line of thought. Although you may not like Jenkins’ conclusions about the mission of the postmodern historian, it is a logical extension of his view of records and a meaningful try to reply the query ‘what now?’ from inside his own mental context.
I am agreeing of some point, like the notion that “truth” is illusory and clearly all we have are beneficial guesses. The truth modifications as our wager turn into extra useful. In science we examine extra and greater about the world around us, but it seems not likely we will ever have all the answers.
Paul Ricoeur (1913-2005) is widely identified as one of the most uncommon philosophers of the twentieth century. Two the principal theme that unites his writings is that of a philosophical anthropology. This anthropology, which Ricoeur got here to call anthropology of the “capable human being,” pursuits to provide an account of the imperative capabilities and vulnerabilities that human beings display in the things to do that make up their lives. Though the accent is constantly on the opportunity of grasp the self as an agent accountable for its actions, Ricoeur constantly rejects any claim that the self is at once obvious to itself or entirely grasp of it. Self-knowledge solely comes via our relation to the world and our existence with and among others in that world.
As we comprehend he talk about the time and narrative, relation between in the first two volumes of this work, Paul Ricoeur examined the family members between time and narrative in historical writing, fiction, and theories of literature. This remaining volume, a complete reexamination and synthesis of the thoughts developed in volumes 1 and 2, stands as Ricoeur’s most entire and satisfying presentation of his personal philosophy.
Ricoeur treats the query of just how a ways the Aristotelian notion of “plot” in narrative fiction can be multiplied and whether or not there is a factor at which narrative fiction as a literary form now not only blurs at the edges however ceases to exist at all. Though some semiotic theorists have proposed all fiction can be reduced to a temporal structure, Ricoeur argues that fiction depends on the reader’s appreciation of narrative traditions, which do evolve however necessarily include a temporal dimension. He looks at how time is truly expressed in narrative fiction, mainly through use of tenses, factor of view, and voice.
He applies this approach to three books that are, in a sense, stories about time: Virgina Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway; Thomas Mann’s Magic Mountain; and Marcel Proust’s Remembrance of Things Past. From this starting point, Ricoeur starts his consideration of records as a form of narrative, which offers foremost activity for analyzing this book. How does history deal with these troubles of time and narrative? Is narrative a critical ingredient of history or an obstacle to a more analytical understanding? Here, he is attempting to explain in the books of the works of Ferdnand Braudel, Paul Veyne, Raymond Aron, Max Weber, R. G. Collingwood, William Dray, Carl Hempel, Arthur C. Danto, and Hayden White all receive consideration.
Central to Ricoeur’s defense of narrative is its capability to characterize the human journey of time. Such ability is a fundamental requisite for a reflective philosophy. Ricoeur sets out his account of “human time” in Time and Narrative, Volume three He points out that we trip time in two distinctive ways. We journey time as linear succession, we experience the passing hours and days and the development of our lives from delivery to death. This is cosmological time which is expressed in the metaphor of the “river” of time. The different is phenomenological time; time skilled in terms of the past, existing and future.
As self-aware embodied beings, we not only experience time as linear succession, but we are also oriented to the succession of time in terms of what has been, what is, and what will be. Ricoeur’s concept of “human time” is expressive of a complex experience in which phenomenological time and cosmological time are integrated. For example, we understand the full meaning of “yesterday” or “today” by reference to their order in a succession of dated time. To say “Today is my birthday” is to immediately invoke both orders of time: a chronological date to which is anchored the phenomenological concept of “birthday.” Ricoeur describes this anchoring as the “inscription” of phenomenological time on cosmological time.
These two conceptions of time have traditionally been considered in opposition, but Ricoeur argues that they share a relation of mutual presupposition. The order of “past-present-future” within phenomenological time presupposes the succession attribute of cosmological time. The previous is constantly earlier than the present which is constantly after the past and before the future. The order of succession is invariable, and this order is not section of the standards of past, current or future viewed simply as existential orientations. On the other hand, within cosmological time, the identification of supposedly anonymous instants of time as “before” or “after” inside the succession borrows from the phenomenological orientation to past and future. Ricoeur argues that any philosophical model for appreciation human existence must appoint a composite temporal framework. The only appropriate candidate here is the narrative model. Ricoeur hyperlinks narrative’s temporal complexity to Aristotle’s characterization of narrative as “the imitation of an action”.
Ricoeur’s account of the way in which narrative represents the human world of acting (and, in its passive mode, suffering) turns on three levels of interpretation that he calls mimesis1 (prefiguration of the discipline of action), mimesis2 (configuration of the area of action), and mimesis3 (refrigeration of the subject of action). Mimesis1 describes the way in which the subject of human appearing is constantly already prefigured with sure fundamental competencies, for example, competency in the conceptual community of the semantics of action (expressed in the ability to increase questions of who, how, why, with whom, in opposition to whom, etc.); in the use of symbols (being capable to grasp one thing as standing for something else); and competency in the temporal structures governing the syntagmatic order of narration (the “follow ability” of a narrative).
Mimesis2 concerns the resourceful configuration of the factors given in the area of action at the stage of mimesis1. Mimesis2 issues narrative “employment.” Ricoeur describes this degree as “the kingdom of the as if” Narrative emplotment brings the numerous elements of a scenario into a resourceful order, in simply the same way as does the plot of a story. Employments here have a mediating function. It configures events, sellers and objects and renders those person factors significant as phase of a larger total in which every takes a place in the community that constitutes the narrative’s response to why, how, who, where, when, etc. By bringing together heterogeneous factors into its syntactical order employments creates a “concordant discordance,” a tensive harmony which features as a re-description of a situation in which the inner coherence of the constitutive factors endows them with an explanatory role. A particularly useful characteristic of narrative which becomes obvious at the stage mimesis2 is the way in which the linear chronology of employments is able to symbolize distinct experiences of time. What is depicted as the “past” and the “present” inside the plot does no longer always correspond to the “before” and “after” of its linear, episodic structure.
For example, a narrative may additionally commence with a culminating event, or it may additionally commit lengthy passages to occasions depicted as occurring within especially brief intervals of time. Dates and times can be disconnected from their denotative function; grammatical tenses can be changed, and modifications in the tempo and duration of scenes create a temporality that is “lived” in the story that does no longer coincide with both the time of the world in which the story is read, nor the time that the unfolding events are stated to depict.
History is epistemological foundation that mean episteme how to we know, what we know, etc. methodology which us help us how do explore history which is based on data, trend, pattern, analysis , wisdom/ policy, economy etc. new history colonial India the idea of history. E.H.Carr may be removing the arbitrary coherent as pursuing influence as per historical knowledge. The analysis must depend on historical range remains knowledge.
According to Croce “contemporaneous” all history interpretation and found rational contemporary yet. Historian rhetoric, he point methodologically “enquiry influence of the idea of history. All history knowledge prehistorically. The idea is an action, activities so that you are applying your own ideas. All are the product of ideas historian.
However, the rational this views challenged by famous historian E.H.Carr agreed of consumption historical knowledge methodically. The use of method the rationalist methods shared undeveloped of consistence. In order to subjectivity which is not manipulating facts know should it overlook the contradictory fact. Multiple plausible explanation the most regress it most of more phenomenon a significant provided. Compensation between accidents improved safety in seriously situation. Accident is three types of 1) Fatal, 2) S.I, 3) M.I. There is no universal knowledge, truth, related truth, realist viewpoint; no single point valid if is in case related or closely truth. They are equally untruth discourse. Hayden White says historical knowledge is historical basis narrative or plot. It is new way of story like any other story.
Cite this essay
Problem of Historical Knowledge. (2019, Nov 18). Retrieved from https://studymoose.com/problem-of-historical-knowledge-essay