Peacekeeping Mission in the DRC

On the other hand although the MONUSCO UN Peacekeeping Mission in the DRC was not very effective it is also of paramount importance to credit the peacekeeping mission for managing to attain peace in the DRC due to the fact that they were some peace agreements that were signed which promoted some stability in the country. The fact that the peacekeepers managed to facilitate the signing of peacekeepers is a success on its side. The mediation theory is one of the theories that can be used when talking about peacekeeping in DRC.

In 1999 the Lusaka ceasefire agreement was signed and this agreement was between the governments of DRC and Rwanda. The main reason behind this cease fire agreement was to track down and disarm the ex-FAR and Interahamwe forces that were still present in the DRC. In order for the process to be a success in being implemented the two governments agreed to involve a third party in order to facilitate the process and a desired result to be achieved as well.

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The Secretary General of the United Nations and South Africa became the mediators of the process who helped with facilitating the process. The DRC wanted the Rwandan government to remove their troops from the Congolese land and they had the legitimate right to have that done.

Whilst the Rwandan government agreed to remove its troops if the right procedure had been followed. In the ceasefire agreement they were some certain agreements that were agreed upon by the two governments and these were:According to Section 8 of the United States Institute of peace, Peace Agreements Digital Collection report (September 2002).

The DRC and Rwandan peace agreement. In this regard, the Parties agree as follows:

1. The DRC government will continue with the process of tracking down and disarming the Interahamwe and ex-FAR within the territory of the DRC under its control.
2. The DRC government will collaborate with MONUC and the JMC in the dismantling of the ex-FAR and Interahamwe forces in the DRC.
3. The Rwandan government undertakes to withdraw its troops from the DRC territory, following the process outlined in paragraph 5. This will be according to measures as detailed in the implementation programme.
4. That MONUC, acting together with all relevant UN Agencies, should be requested to immediately set up processes to repatriate all Rwandese, ex-FAR and Interahamwe to Rwanda, including those in Kamina, in co-ordination with the governments of Rwanda and the DRC.
5. The governments of the DRC and Rwanda would provide the facilitator of this meeting and the UN Secretary General with all the information in their possession relating to these armed groups.
6. The third party will take responsibility for verifying whatever information received, through whatever measures deemed necessary.8.7 The Parties agree to accept the verification report from the third party.
7. That the UN considers changing the mandate of MONUC into a Peace-keeping mission.
8. MONUC should immediately proceed to implement Phase 3 of its DDRR and finalise its deployment in the DRC, especially in the eastern part of the territory.
9. The Parties agree that their respective governments would put into place a mechanism for the normalization of the security situation along their common border. This mechanism may include the presence of an International Force to cooperate with the two countries, in the short term, to secure their common border.
10. That a bilateral team, facilitated by South Africa and the UN Secretary General, work on a detailed calendar to implement this agreement.
11. Both Parties commit themselves to accepting the role and findings of the third party in the process of implementing this agreement, and further accept that the commitments and agreements reached in this Peace Agreement are binding.

Although the ceasefire agreement was signed it was very difficult for peace to be achieved as DRC was very skeptical when it came to trusting its neighboring countries with the inclusion of Rwanda. Adding on the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement had its own weaknesses thus this resulted in its failure to achieve what had been agreed upon between DRC and Rwanda. Bellamy (2010) et al is of the notion that it was the ceasefire agreement process was disrupted due to the presence of issues such as the liaison officers' failure to identify severe ceasefire violations; a lack of commitment from the signatories; and the exclusion of armed belligerents from the agreement.

Williams (2012) argues that the combination of complex conflicts, problematic agreements, a large number of parties and armed belligerents, 'leave peacekeepers operating in zones where the occurrence of warfare is a constant threat. He highlights that there is a considerable risk of sending peacekeepers to zones where there is no peace to keep. He also lists factors, endogenous and exogenous to the peacekeeping operation, that affect peacekeepers capabilities to keep the peace. The list includes complex mandates, an insufficient number of troops and police, an insufficient number of Western or well-trained troops, and, lastly, what he terms 'too many' bad peacekeepers. He uses different cases to illustrate his respective points, some of which include MONUSCO peacekeeping.