Common law Essay
A Tort is the French word for a “wrong.” A tort is a civil wrong. A civil wrong involves a breach of a duty owed to someone else, as opposed to criminal wrongdoing which involves a breach of a duty owed to society. Torts are civil wrongs other than breaches of contract and certain equitable wrongs.
The law of torts law is a remainder category of civil wrongs once other wrongs are excluded. It covers a grab bag of legal cases comprising such disparate topics as auto accidents, false imprisonment, slander and libel, product liability (such as defectively designed consumer products), and environmental pollution (toxic torts).
A person who suffers legal damage may be able to use tort law to receive damages (usually monetary compensation) from someone who is responsible or liable for those injuries. Generally speaking, tort law defines what is a legal injury and what is not. A person may be held liable (responsible to pay) for another’s injury caused by them. Torts can be classified in a number of different ways, one is to distinguish according to degree of fault, so that there are intentional torts, negligent torts, and strict liability torts.
In much of the Western world, the measure of tort liability is negligence. If the injured party cannot prove that the person believed to have caused the injury acted with negligence (lack of reasonable care), at the very least, tort law will not compensate (pay) the victim. However, tort law also recognizes intentional (purposeful) torts and strict liability torts, which apply when the person accused of committing the tort satisfied certain standards of intent (meaning) and/or performed certain types of conduct.
In tort law, injury is defined broadly. Injury does not just mean a physical injury, such as where Brenda was struck by a ball. Injuries in tort law reflect any invasion of any number of individual interests. This includes interests recognized in other areas of law, such as property rights. Actions
for nuisance (annoying or hurting) and trespass (unlawful entering) of land can arise from interfering with rights in real property. Conversion law and trespass to chattels (personal property) can protect interference with movable property. Interests in prospective (possible future) economic advantages from signed agreements can also be injured and become the subject of tort actions. A number of situations caused by parties in a contractual (written agreement) relationship may still be tort rather than contract claims, such as breach of duties.
Tort law may also be used to compensate (pay) for injuries to a number of other individual interests that are not recognized in property or contract law. This includes an interest in freedom from emotional distress, privacy interests, and reputation. These are protected by a number of torts such as Intentional infliction of emotional distress, privacy torts, and defamation/slander (destruction of a reputation). Defamation and privacy torts may, for example, allow a celebrity to sue a newspaper for publishing an untrue and harmful statement about him. Other protected interests include freedom of movement, protected by the intentional tort of false imprisonment which is when you are arrested without cause.
The equivalent of tort in civil law jurisdictions is delict. The law of torts can be categorised as part of the law of obligations (duties), but unlike voluntarily assumed obligations (such as those of contract, or trust), the duties imposed by the law of torts apply to all those subject to the relevant jurisdiction. To behave in tortious manner is to harm another’s rights, body, property or other rights. One who commits a tortious act is called a tortfeasor.
Law of torts consists of some general defense, which can be pleaded in the court of law to get justice. Types of general defenses
1) INEVITABLE ACCIDENTS: The plea of inevitable accident is usually spoken of as a defense but is, strictly speaking, not a defense but only a denial of liability. For instance, in an action for bodily harm, the plaintiff has ordinarily to prove intent or negligence of the defendant; and if he fails to do so, his injury may be said to be an inevitable accident.
The burden to prove plea of inevitable accident lies on the defendant and to establish the defense, the respondent will have to establish that accident could not have been avoided by exercise of ordinary care and caution. Ex: Ryland’s v Fletcher
2) MISTAKE: Mistake of law is generally no defense to civil or criminal liability. Mistake of fact is a general defense under the IPC, but not to an action in tort. For instance, an officer who executes a warrant of arrest against the wrong man by mistake is not guilty of a crime, but he will be liable in an action for false imprisonment. Mistake would be an excuse only in those exceptional cases where an unlawful intent or motive is an essential ingredient in liability. Ex: Hollins v Fowler
3) EXERCISE OF COMMON RIGHTS: This, like inevitable accident, is really nota defense but a denial of a breach of duty or violation of rights, as where the defendant builds on his land and shuts f the light of a new house of his neighbour or opens a new shop and ruins an older rival. The defense is necessary on the assumption that their is a general rule of liability for intentional harm.
4) VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA: It is also known as the defense of consent.
Volenti non fit injuria
It is a Latin word which means “to a willing person, no injury is done” or “no injury is done to a person who consents”) is a common law doctrine which means that if someone willingly places themselves in a position where harm might result, knowing that some degree of harm might result, they cannot then sue if harm actually results.
Volenti only applies to the risk which a reasonable person would consider them as having assumed by their actions; thus a boxer consents to being hit, and to the injuries that might be expected from being hit, but does not consent to (for example) his opponent striking him with an iron bar, or punching him outside the usual terms of boxing. Volenti is also known as a
“voluntary assumption of risk.”
In Law of Torts, Volenti non-fit injuria is an exception to liability in torts.
It means: Where the sufferer is willing and has the knowledge , no injury is done. the precept that denotes that a person who knows and comprehends the peril and voluntarily exposes himself or herself to it, although not negligent in doing so, is regarded as engaging in an assumption of the risk and is precluded from a recovery for an injury ensuing there from.
Volenti non fit iniuria (or injuria) (Latin: “to a willing person, injury is not done”) is a common law doctrine which states that if someone willingly places with proper knowledge themselves in a position where harm might result, they are not able to bring a claim against any damages from the other party in tort. Volenti only applies to the risk which a reasonable person would consider them as having assumed by their actions; thus a boxer consents to being hit, and to the injuries that might be expected from being hit, but does not consent to (for example) his opponent striking him with an iron bar, or punching him outside the usual terms of boxing. Or a person watching a cricket match getting hurt by the ball can be consented.
No act is actionable as a tort at the suit of a person who has expressly or impliedly assented to it.
In order to plead this defence, it is necessary that the plaintiff should have consented to physical risk or damage as well as to legal risk (i.e. he will get no remedy in law).
▪ Consent must be given freely
▪ Consent must not have been given to an illegal act
▪ Knowledge of risk is not the same thing as consent to run the risk OR
1. A voluntary
3. Made in full knowledge of the nature and extent of the risk.
The agreement must be voluntary and freely entered for the defence of Volenti non fit injuria to succeed. If the Claimant is not in a position to exercise free choice, the defence will not succeed. This element is most commonly seen in relation to employment relationships, rescuers and suicide.
The second requirement for the defence of Volenti non fit injuria is agreement. The agreement may be express or implied. An example of an express agreement would be where there exists a contractual term or notice.
The Claimant must have knowledge of the full nature and extent of the risk that they ran. The test for this is subjective and not objective and in the context of an intoxicated Claimant, the question is whether the Claimant was so intoxicated that he was incapable of appreciating the nature of the risk.
Volenti is sometimes described as the plaintiff “consenting to run a risk.” In this context, volenti can be distinguished from legal consent in that the latter can prevent some torts arising in the first place (for example, consent to a medical procedure prevents the procedure from being a trespass to the person, or consenting to a person visiting your land prevents them from being a trespasser). | |
Volenti in English
In English tort law, volenti is a full defence, i.e. it fully exonerates the defendant who succeeds in proving it. The defence has two main elements: The claimant was fully aware of all the risks involved, including both the nature and the extent of the risk; and The claimant expressly (by his statement) or impliedly (by his actions) consented to waive all claims for damages. His knowledge of the risk is not sufficient: sciens non est. volens (“knowing is not volunteering”). His consent must be free and voluntary, i.e. not brought about by duress. If the relationship between the claimant and defendant is such that there is doubt as to whether the consent was truly voluntary, such as the relationship between workers and employers, the courts are unlikely to find volenti. It is not easy for a defendant to show both elements and therefore contributory negligence usually constitutes a better defence in many cases. Note however that contributory negligence is a partial defence, i.e. it usually leads to a reduction of payable damages rather than a full exclusion of liability. Also, the person consenting to an act may not always be negligent: a bungee jumper may take the greatest possible care not to be injured, and if he is, the defence available to the organiser of the event will be volenti, not contributory negligence.
In the first case (decided before the Occupier’s Liability Act was passed), a girl who had trespassed on the railway was hit by a train. The House of Lords ruled that the fencing around the railway was adequate, and the girl had voluntarily accepted the risk by breaking through it. In the second case, a student who had broken into a closed swimming-pool and injured himself by diving into the shallow end was similarly held responsible for his own injuries. The third case involved a man who dived into a shallow lake, despite the presence of “No Swimming” signs; the signs were held to be an adequate warning. The defence of volenti is now excluded by statute where a passenger was injured as a result of agreeing to take a lift from a drunk car driver. However, in a well-known case of Morris v Murray [volenti was held to apply to a drunk passenger, who accepted a lift from
a drunk pilot. The pilot died in the resulting crash and the passenger who was injured, sued his estate. Although he drove the pilot to the airfield (which was closed at the time) and helped him start the engine and tune the radio, he argued that he did not freely and voluntarily consent to the risk involved in flying. The Court of Appeal held that there was consent: the passenger was not so drunk as to fail to realise the risks of taking a lift from a drunk pilot, and his actions leading up to the flight demonstrated that he voluntarily accepted those risks. Rescuers
For reasons of policy, the courts are reluctant to criticize the behavior of rescuers. A rescuer would not be considered volens if: He was acting to rescue persons or property endangered by the defendant’s negligence; He was acting under a compelling legal, social or moral duty; and His conduct in all circumstances was reasonable and a natural consequence of the defendant’s negligence. An example of such a case is Haynes v. Harwood, in which a policeman was able to recover damages after being injured restraining a bolting horse: he had a legal and moral duty to protect life and property and as such was not held to have been acting as a volunteer or giving willing consent to the action – it was his contractual obligation as an employee and police officer and moral necessity as a human being to do so, and not a wish to volunteer, which caused him to act. By contrast, in Cutler v. United Dairies a man who was injured trying to restrain a horse was held to be volens because in that case no human life was in immediate danger and he was not under any compelling duty to act.
Unsuccessful attempts to rely on volenti:
Examples of cases where a reliance on volenti was unsuccessful include: Nettleship v. Weston
Baker v T E Hopkins & Son Ltd).
In the first case, the plaintiff was an instructor who was injured while teaching the defendant to drive. The defence of volenti failed i.e. because the plaintiff specifically inquired if the defendant’s insurance covered him before agreeing to teach. In the second case, a doctor went in to try to
rescue workmen who were caught in a well after having succumbed to noxious fumes. He did so despite being warned of the danger and told to wait until the fire brigade arrived. The doctor and the workmen all died. The court held that it would be “unseemly” to hold the doctor to have consented to the risk simply because he acted promptly and bravely in an attempt to save lives.
Hall v. Brooklands Auto-Racing Club 
The plaintiff paid to enter a motor-car race track to watch races on a track owned and managed by the defendants. On the evening the plaintiff was spectating, two of the race-cars collided near the barrier between the spectators and the track. The cars collided with the barrier and caused severe injury to the plaintiff and others.
The defendants were held liable to pay damages by a jury who found that they had not taken reasonable precautions to protect spectators. On appeal by the defendant, it was held that there was no evidence to find the defendants had not taken reasonable precautions and that there was no obligation to ensure safety in all circumstances, just that reasonable precautions were taken. The defendant’s case was upheld.
Wooldridge v Sumner 
The plaintiff, Mr. Wooldridge, who was a photographer at a horse race, was injured by the horse belonging to the defendant, Sumner, which was ridden in a competition by Sumner’s, who was a skilled and experienced horseman.
The Court of Appeal held that Sumner owed no duty of care to Wooldridge in this case. As a spectator, Wooldridge accepted the risks involved in a horserace he came to watch. As a reasonable participant in the race, which
is a fast and competitive sport, the horseman was expected to concentrate on the race and not on the spectator. In the course of a fast moving competition such as this one, he could be expected to make errors of judgment. As long as the damage was not caused recklessly or deliberately, the participant in a race could not be held liable for the spectators’ injuries because he was not negligent, i.e. not in breach of his duty.
Dann v. Hamilton 
The Claimant was injured when she was a willing passenger in the car driven by the Mr. Hamilton. He had been drinking and the car was involved in a serious crash which killed him. In a claim for damages the Defendant raised the defence of volenti non fit injuria in that in accepting the lift knowing of his drunken condition she had voluntarily accepted the risk.
The defence was unsuccessful. The claimant was entitled to damages.
“There may be cases in which the drunkenness of the driver at the material time is so extreme and so glaring that to accept a lift from him is like engaging in an intrinsically and obviously dangerous occupation, intermeddling with an unexploded bomb or walking on the edge of an unfenced cliff. It is not necessary to decide whether in such a case the maxim volenti non fit injuria would apply, for in the present case I find as a fact that the driver’s degree of intoxication fell short of this degree”. HAYNES v HARWOOD 
The plaintiff, a police constable, was on duty inside a police station in a street in which, at the material time, were a large number of people, including children. Seeing the defendants’ runaway horses with a van
attached coming down the street he rushed out and eventually stopped them, sustaining injuries in consequence, in respect of which he claimed damages. HELD
1) That on the evidence the defendants’ servant was guilty of negligence in leaving the horses unattended in a busy street.
2) that as the defendants must or ought to have contemplated that some one might attempt to stop the horses in an endeavour to prevent injury to life and limb, and as the police were under a general duty to intervene to protect life and property, the act of, and injuries to, the plaintiff were the natural and probable consequences of the defendants’ negligence.
3) That the maxim “volenti non fit injuria” did not apply to prevent the plaintiff recovering.
1 Imperial Chemical Industries v Shatwell 
Volenti non fit injuria, [Latin: no wrong is done to one who consents] The defense that the plaintiff consented to the injury or (more usually) to the risk of being injured.
The plaintiff and his brother were were certificated and experienced shotfirers employed by ICI Ltd in a quarry owned by the defendant company. Part of the brothers’ works included wiring up detonators and checking the electrical circuits. There was an old practice where a galvanometer was applied directly to each detonator for testing purposes. This practice was known to be dangerous and was outlawed by statutory regulation. The plaintiff claimed his brother was 50 per cent to blame for the explosion and the employer was vicariously liable. The plaintiff was awarded half of the total amount of damages. The defendant appealed.
The plaintiff and his brother were both experts. They freely and voluntarily assumed the risk involved in using the galvanometer. There was no pressure from any other source. To the contrary, they were specifically warned about complying with the new safety regulations. The defence of volenti non-fit injuria will apply when there is true and free consent to the risk. Note
(1) the employers not being themselves in breach of duty, any liability of theirs would be vicarious liability for the fault of J, and to such liability (whether for negligence or for breach of statutory duty) the principle volenti non fit injuria afforded a defence, where, as here, the facts showed that G and J knew and accepted the risk (albeit a remote risk) of testing in a way that contravened their employers’ instructions and the statutory regulations.
(2) Each of them, G and J, (the brothers) emerged from their joint enterprise as author of his own injury, and neither should be regarded as having contributed a separate wrongful act injuring the other.
The defence of volenti non fit injuria should be available where the employer is not himself in breach of statutory duty and is not vicariously in breach of any statutory duty through neglect of some person of superior rank to the plaintiff and whose commands the plaintiff is bound to obey, or who has some special and different duty of care.
Nettleship v Weston 
is an English Court of Appeal judgment dealing with the breach of duty in negligence claims. In this case the court had considered the question of the standard of care that should be applied to a learner driver, and whether it should be the same as is expected of an experienced driver.
Mr. Nettleship, the plaintiff, agreed to teach Mrs. Weston, the defendant, to drive in her husband’s car, after he had inquired the insurance policy. During one of the lessons, the defendant lost control of the car and caused an accident in which the plaintiff was injured. The defendant argued that the plaintiff was well aware of her lack of skill and that the court should make allowance for her since she could not be expected to drive like an experienced motorist.
The Court of Appeal, consisting of Lord Denning MR, Salmon LJ and Megaw LJ held that applying a lower standard to the learner driver because the instructor was aware of his inexperience would result in complicated shifting standards. It would imply, for example, that an inexperienced doctor owed his patient a lower standard of care if the patient was aware of his lack of experience. The standard of care for a learner driver would be the usual standard applied to drivers: that of an experienced and skilled driver. The policy consideration that played a role in this decision was that the learner driver was covered by insurance.
Over the dissent of Megaw LJ, the Court of Appeal held that the instructor was also responsible for the accident as he was partially in control of the car and should only be able to recover half of his damages due to negligence. Able to recover half of his damages due to contributory negligence.
Baker v T E Hopkins & Son Ltd
Two employees of the defendant company were overcome by carbon monoxide fumes in a well they were attempting to decontaminate. The plaintiff, a doctor,
went in to try to rescue them even though he was warned of the fumes and told that the fire brigade was on the way. All the three men died.
The defendant company argued that the (the estate of) the plaintiff doctor should either not be compensated because the doctor knowingly accepted the risk he was taking or his damages would be reduced for contributory negligence. The Court of Appeal considered that such a suggestion was “ungracious” and that it was unseemly and irrational to say that a rescuer freely takes on the risks inherent in a rescue attempt. The doctor’s contributory negligence could only be recognized if he showed “a wholly unreasonable disregard for his own safety”.
This case is one of the many in which the courts have refused to hold rescuers who have suffered in their rescue attempts to have negligently contributed to their injuries or accepted the risks involved in their rescue attempt. This applies to both amateur and professional rescuers, such as fire fighters (See Ogwo v. Tailor )
United India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs Guguloth Khana And Ors.
On 23-5-1991 a lorry bearing No. AP 26-T-364 belonging to M/s. Amruthesh Transport Company started at Warangal with some load of groundnut oil cake to go to Anakapalle in Visakhapatnam. One Ch. Mallikarjun was engaged as driver of the said lorry. There was a comprehensive insurance policy for the lorry with the United India Insurance Company. When the lorry reached near Thorrur village on the way leading to Khammamm P.W.D. Road, several villagers were waiting on the road, due to lack of transport facility
because of the assassination of Sri Rajiv Gandhi on the previous day (22-5-1991). Then, about 25 persons, including some children and women boarded the lorry. The lorry, after travelling about five kilometers from Thorrur village and reached near Mattedu village, the driver of the lorry applied sudden brakes whereby the lorry turned turtle, as a result of which twelve persons died on the spot and three more persons also died after they were taken to hospital. Ten persons sustained injuries. The claimants, either the injured or the legal heirs of the persons who died in the accident, have filed the O.Ps against the owner, driver and insurer of the lorry.
Before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, the driver of the lorry who was served with notices in the O.Ps remained ex parte. Before the Tribunal, owner of the lorry filed counter, denying the averments in the O.Ps, contending that the driver of the lorry was not responsible for the accident. It was contended that at the time of the accident, another lorry was coming in the opposite direction at high speed in a rash and negligent manner, and to avert accident, the driver of the lorry applied sudden brakes by taking the lorry to the extreme left side of the road. Due to bad condition of the road, the lorry turned turtle resulting in fatal road accident. He also contended that he has given strict instructions to the lorry drivers not to carry passengers on their lorries.
Before the Tribunal, the present appellant-Insurance Company also filed counters admitting that the lorry involved in the accident was insured with it as a goods vehicle, in which passengers are not allowed to travel. It was contended that as per the conditions of insurance policy only six persons are authorized to travel in the lorry and that the persons who travelled in the lorry were unauthorized passengers. It was contended that even if for any reason it is considered that the deceased and injured are non-fare paying passengers, the liability of the Insurance Company is limited to Rs. 15,000/- in case of death and lesser amount for injuries. The Insurance Company disputed the quantum of compensation claimed in the O.Ps. by the
• Whether the accident took place due to rash and/or negligent driving by respondent No. 1?
• To what compensation if any, the petitioners are entitled to and if so, against which of the respondents?
• To what relief ?
Subsequently, the issues were recast as under:
➢ Whether the accident took place due to rash and/or negligent driving of the lorry by its driver Ch. Mallikarjun?
➢ Whether there were specific instructions issued to the drivers of the Transport Company that they should not carry passengers enroute and if so, on that ground that owner of the crime vehicle is not liable to pay the compensation in the claim petitions?
➢ Whether the third respondent Insurance Company is not liable to cover the risk of the deceased and injured involved in the accident under the terms of the Insurance policy, the copy of which is marked as Ex.B-1 along with the terms and conditions of the policy including Indian Motor Tariff marked as Ex. B-2?
➢ Whether the petitioners are entitled for compensation, if so, to what amount and from whom?
➢ To what relief?
(a) On consideration of the oral and documentary evidence on record, the Tribunal held that the accident has taken place due to rash and negligent driving of the lorry by its driver. The Tribunal negatived the contention of the owner of the lorry that he is not liable to pay compensation. Basing on these two findings and the medical and documentary evidence available on record, different amounts of compensations were granted to the different claimants in the respective O.Ps, who are arrayed as respondents in the appeals.
(b) Aggrieved by the same, the present appeals are filed by the Insurance Company.
(c) The first contention advanced by the Counsel for the appellant-Insurance Company is that the injured/deceased who travelled in the lorry are unauthorized passengers in a goods vehicle and the insurance policy issued is for the goods vehicle and there is no reason to fasten the liability on the Insurance Company; it is a violation of policy conditions and there is no need to fix the liability against the present appellant-Insurance Company.
(d) The second contention advanced by the Counsel for the appellant-Insurance Company is that the owner of the lorry got examined R.W. 1, Manager in the Transport Company, who stated that he was informed by the driver of the lorry that the injured/ deceased unauthorisedly entered the lorry, and the maxim/doctrine “volenti non fit injuria” applied to this case as they voluntarily entered into the lorry at their own risk and there is no reason to fasten liability on the Insurance Company.
(e) In these cases, so far as the first contention of the Counsel for appellant that the claimants/respondents are travelling as a gratuitous passengers in a goods vehicle and not entitled for compensation and the Insurance Company is not liable to pay any such compensation, is concerned, it is contrary to the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in New India Assurance Company v. Shri Satpal Singh and Ors. . In that case, the
Supreme Court considering clause (ii) of proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Old Act) and Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (new Act), and noticing the absence of a similar clause in the new Act, held”…………under the new Act an insurance policy covering third party risk is not required to exclude gratuitous passengers in a vehicle, no matter that the vehicle is of any type or class”. In view of the above ruling of the Supreme Court, there is no merit in the first contention of the appellant, that the injured/legal heirs of the deceased in these cases are not entitled to any compensation on the ground that they are gratuitous passengers, is without substance and the same is hereby rejected.
[i](f) Learned Counsel for the appellant-Insurance Company relied on the decision in V. Gangamma v. New India Assurance Co. wherein a learned Single Judge of this Court held that the Insurance Company is not liable to pay compensation to the dependants of the deceased persons who are travelling in the vehicle at the time of accident as trespassers and not as passengers. The facts of that case are entirely different from that of the facts in these appeals. In the case cited, the claimants were treated as passengers on the basis of evidence of R. W. 1 (the driver of the lorry therein), who categorically stated that the claimants-therein have forcibly entered into the lorry asking him to take them to particular place and threatened to beat him if he does not do so. In the present cases, there is no evidence to show that the claimants/deceased entered into the lorry forcibly with any threat to the driver of the lorry. So, the decision in Gangamma’s case (3 supra) is not applicable to the case on hand.
The appeals was dismissed.
• Rmaswamy Ayers LAW OF TORTS 10th edn.(by A Lakshminath &M Ssridhar)
• Winfield and jodowiez, TORT WVH Jogers,7th edn.
• 1990] 3 All ER 801 ( Court of Appeal),
•  1 KB
•  2 KB 297
•  3 All ER 581 (Court of Appeal
•  3 All ER 225 (Court of Appeal
• (1933) 1 KB 205
•  2 QB 23
• 1959] 3 All ER 225 (Court of Appeal
•  AC 431).
• II (2001) ACC 392, 2001 (2) ALT 185
 RD-SC 411
 Rmaswamy ayers LAW OF TORTS 10th edn.p.939(by A Lakshminath &M Ssridhar)  Rmaswamy ayers LAW OF TORTS 10th edn.p.940(by A Lakshminath &M Ssridhar)  Rmaswamy ayers LAW OF TORTS 10th edn.p.940(by A Lakshminath &M Ssridhar)  Rmaswamy ayers LAW OF TORTS 10th edn.p.940(by A Lakshminath &M Ssridhar)  Winfield and jodowiez,TORT WVH Jogers,7th edn.P.1057
 Winfield and jodowiez,TORT WVH Jogers,7th edn.P.1058
1990] 3 All ER 801 ( Court of Appeal),
  1 KB 146
  2 KB 297
  3 All ER 581 (Court of Appeal
  3 All ER 225 (Court of Appeal
 (1933) 1 KB 205
  2 QB 23
  1 KB 50
  1 KB 146
  All ER 999
  2 QB 691
 1959] 3 All ER 225 (Court of Appeal
  AC 431).
 II (2001) ACC 392, 2001 (2) ALT 185
5   RD-SC 411
|LAW OF TORTS |August 29 | | |2013 | |THIS RESEARCH PAPER BRINGS OUT THE APPLICATION OF VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA, AS A | VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA &CASES | |DEFENCE IN TORT LAW. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |