Bureaucratic Politics and Intelligence in the Falklands War 1982 Essay
Bureaucratic Politics and Intelligence in the Falklands War 1982
The Farklands war began on Friday, 2 April 1982. The fight was between Argentina and the United Kingdom (UK). The main dispute was over Farklands Islands and South Georgia and the other Islands known as South Sandwich. The fatalities of the violence included many people such as left-wing activists, trade unionists, students and even journalists. The Farkland Island was well known for its abundant supply of oil within its territorial waters. Argentina had already occupied the islands which was a British colony.
Their main aim was to relocate attention from economical and social problems at that particular time (Grant, 2000, 3). Therefore, it was a political contrive by the Argentine political government to break away from its own state of social conflicts. Jorge Rafael Videla’s military dictatorship as part of the Operation Condor carried out the state terrorism. The Farklands conflict marked the great use of modern weapon systems under the military theorists. All the main elements of military theory came into practice at that period.
This included several elements such as public enthusiasm, national determination, opportunity and miscalculation. Additionally, the war was itself an inquisitive combination of modern high-tech warfare and low-tech. The British forces were much outnumbered on the war ground. They never had the exact air true covers and only what they had was the aircraft that came with the task force. The bureaucratic politics played a major role in ensuring the victory of the British during the Farklands war. For instance, four factors are said to have neccessitated the British success.
This includes, effective and sufficient training of the military, good leadership by the political leaders who gave them a lot of support, courage in the army and above all the Britain’s closest supporter, the United States. The endorsement of the United State’s policy towards the Farklands conflict provides an adequate evidence of how bureaucratic politics was involved during the war. The proper response of the above mentioned policy was properly constituted and played at the highest levels of the Reagan administration.
The process was mainly confined entirely to the executive branch which was by that time dominated by the conformist view of the America’s place in the whole world. On the other hand, Graham T. Allison’s bureaucratic politics did not support the acceptance of the foreign policy goals. The president Reagan’s leadership style, the relationship of assorted personalities, conflicting interpretations of national interest and the opposing bureaucratic imperatives played a main role in creating a situation that was being characterized by disperse power and multiple actions in the war (Gustafson, 1998, 14).
During the 1982 Falklands war, the Thatcher government attempted to assume an isolated and remote colony in the South Atlantic as British sovereign territory was very important in ensuring the mobilization of the media and also the support for the war recovery campaign. The re-imaginative process also included the role of the rural imagery. Additionally, the government-imposed censorship enhanced positive reporting of the war campaign. During the Falklands war, there were some negotiations between the two sides to avoid war but an agreement was never reached.
This means that the use of diplomacy had failed in the Falklands Islands (Mauro, nd, 3). The main reason that constituted to this disagreement is that, there was a lot of misconstruction between the British and the Argentines. For instance, The Argentines never believed that the British would retaliate and on the other hand, the British always fought to believe that Argentina wanted a peaceful solution. Regarding the president’s personalities they were required to remain and appear very strong in terms of the diplomatic principles.
The diplomatic solution was however not reached in the Falklands due to the political self-preservation, practical obstructions and diplomatic principle that were being practiced by the political leaders. During that time of war, the Argentina’s rulers were under the General Galtieri, a murderous, unpopular military junta. When they invaded the Falklands islands, they decided to make themselves less unpopular at home with the forces of Argentine prejudice behind them. This enabled them to be aware of all what was happening in the world around them and support Galtieri invasion and occupation.
Margaret Thatcher together with her government in Britain was at that particular time very unpopular at home too. As a result of 1982 defeat, a vicious and incompetent dictatorship was overthrown in Argentina and then democracy was restored back (Robert, 1988, 428). The army was subjected to a civilian rule and was also transformed into modern professional institutions that were devoted to regional integration and peace. The Role of Intelligence in Explaining the War of Falklands 1982. The Britain intelligence professionals disregarded signs of political unrest and particular military intelligence communications from Argentina.
As a result of their ignorance, they were vulnerable to surprise attacks. Another factor that contributed to the acceleration of the Falkland conflict was the neglected United State diplomatic efforts and reactions. The British were enjoying the privilege to access the U. S intelligence in their policy making. Intelligence was only considered to be the main determining factor in making of foreign policy that was being used during the war (Justin, 2007, 6). Application of intelligence enabled the successful conduct of the military operations of the Britain and the Argentina government.
Domestic ratification of international agreement which seemed so much peculiar was applied during the Farkland war. In win-set game theory, the agreement was only possible if those win-sets overlaps and the larger each win-set and more probably they overlap. However, the smaller the win-sets, the more the risk those negotiations between the parties will finally break down. This was the same case that applied during the prolonged pre-war Anglo-Argentine conciliation over the Farklands islands. Tentative agreements were opposed in one capital or the other.
This was mainly caused by political reasons when it became vivid that the earlier British and Argentine win-sets did not overlap at. As a result, the war became virtually inevitable. The negotiations were interpreted in terms of a bureaucratic politics model of level 11 politicking The armed forces of Britain were much closer to those of the United States and their air forces worked together during the Falklands war. The Britain also had well collaboration of weapons programme which was very strong in the nuclear area (Sean, 2007, 9).
Additionally, there was much co-operation on human intelligence between Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Britain’s Secret Intelligence service (SIS). The intelligence services included satellite photos, unmanned aerial vehicles and other defense intelligence staff. Therefore, the Britain found it much easier to re-conquer Falklands because of the American intelligence. The Argentines used up-to date intelligence together with their detailed skills and knowledge. For instance, the Argentine ships were sailing to and around the Falkland Islands testing the Argentine defenses.
During the Falklands conflict, France seemed to be very helpful to the Britain in support of intelligence. For instance, President Mitterrand instructed the French intelligence services to help the Britain track the movements of an Argentine ship that sailed close to France and Spain and was suspected of trying to get French-made military hardware. Additionally, the selective discharges of French signals intelligence were of great benefit to the Britain during the Falklands war. References Gustafson, L 1988, The Sovereignty Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, Oxford University Press, New York
Justin, V 2007, Argentina and Britain: the lessons of war, viewed 5 August 2010 from <http://www. opendemocracy. net/conflict-falklands_malvinas/lessons_vogler_4495. jsp> Mauro, J nd, The Falklands Islands War: Diplomatic Failure in April 1982. Wake forest University, viewed on 5 August 2010 from <http://www. historymatters. appstate. edu/documents/falklandislandswar_000. pdf> Robert, D 1988, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level Game. International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 427-460.
Viewed 5 August 2010 from <http://portal. uam. es/portal/page/portal/UAM_ORGANIZATIVO/Departamentos/CienciaPoliticaRelacionesInternacionales/personal/fernando_rodrigo/pagina_personal_fernando_rodrigo/teoria_relaciones_inter/Textos/Putnam-%20The%20Logic%20of%20Two-Level%20Games. pdf> Sean, M 2007, Some Reflections on the Falklands War and the Kitsch-left Now Viewed on 5 August 2010 from <http://www. workersliberty. org/node/8076> Grant, C 2000, Intimate Relations, viewed 5 August 2010 from <http://www. cer. org. uk/pdf/cerwp4. pdf>