1. Two preliminary steps taken, that may be necessary, before one can intui? vely appreciate the rightness of an ac? on are thinking fully about the consequences of an ac? on. In other words, think before you act. Also give thought (considera? on) to the persons involved in said ac? on or your rela? on(ship) with the persons involved. 2. An ac? on is considered morally good in addi? on to being right when it is the right thing to do, while also stemming from a good place. When the person or “agent” performs said act because it is right, from a feeling of obliga?
on, a morally good act is also right. 3. According to Prichard, an ac? on done from a sense of obliga? on, there is no purpose “consis? ng either in the ac? on itself or in anything which it will produce”. A mo? ve, being something that moves one to act, can be the sense of obliga? on, an ac? on done from a sense of obliga? on can indeed have a mo? ve. 4. Avirtuous act is done from a desire that is intrinsically good. A moral act may be done from obliga? on.
There can’t be an obliga? on to act virtuously, because we can only “feel an obliga? on to act” or do something. We cannot, however, feel an obliga? on to act from a certain desire 5. It is a mistake to expect moral philosophy to prove through argumenta? on that we ought to ful+ll our obliga? ons, because moral rightness “cannot be demonstrated, only apprehended directly by an act of moral thinking”. The sense of obliga? on is a result of a moral thought or thoughts. Moral philosophy can provide re-ec? on on the “immediacy of our knowledge of moral rightness” and the intui? ve recogni? on of the goodness of the virtues.