The paper “International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs, by Charles Lipson, published in the October 1984 issue of “World Politics” focuses on analyzing the different forms of strategic interaction that address issues pertaining to international cooperation in economic and security affairs. It analyzes the use of the Prisoner’s Dilemma theory to help clarify some basic features of international conflict and cooperation as well as some objections for its usage as a model of international interaction.
It also discusses factors that affect the relationship between superpowers, the hegemonic system, the effect of recessions, the evolution of cooperation as well as detailed account of sustained economic cooperation among developed nations. The Prisoner’s Dilemma theory demonstrates both the possible benefits from cooperation and the factors that hinder it. The study of international political economy must address how relationships are corrected to make cooperation of exchange sensibly secure.
The author emphasizes the main issue in international relations theory, which is the emergence and maintenance of cooperation among sovereign, self-interest states, performing in the absence of centralized authority. Every nation must readily commit to comply with economic agreements in order to facilitate trust and eliminate the risks of cooperating. Strategic cooperation is important in encouraging the creation of rules, norms, and political institutions in the international economy and in security affairs. It is also important to understand the pattern of rule construction in international cooperation.